

**U.S.S. SEGUNDO(SS398)
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
5 JANUARY 1945**

From: The Commanding Officer, USS SEGUNDO(SS398)

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

- (1)The Commander Submarine Division TWO EIGHTY TWO.**
- (2)The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY EIGHT.**
- (3)The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.**
- (4)The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.**

Subject: U.S.S. SEGUNDO(SS398) - Report of War Patrol Number Two.

Enclosure: (A)Subject Report.

(B)Track Chart(ComSubPac only).

- 1. Enclosure (A), covering the second war patrol of this vessel conducted in LUZON STRAIT & SOUTH CHINA SEA area during the period 16 November 1944 to 5 January 1945, is forwarded herewith.**

J.D. FULP, Jr.

(A)PROLOBUE

Arrived MAJURO on 21 October 1944, from First War Patrol and reported to ComSubRon FOURTEEN, (Captain W.D. WILKINS,USN.) and ComSubDiv (Comdr. D.F. WEISS, USN), for refit. Refit accomplished by USS BUSHNELL and Submarine Division 142, Relief Crew. During refit period ship was docked in ARD-16, bottom cleaned and painted, and routine sea valve work accomplished. Officers and crew spent two very enjoyable weeks at MYRNA IS. rest camp, which was designed for relaxation and recuperation, and returned to the ship to find it spick and span and in Number One condition throughout. Two days were spent in getting squared away on board again and in conducting post-refit tests and inspections. This was followed by a day of USE during which underway sound tests were held. The officers conducting the sound tests stated the SEGUNDO's reduction gears were well below the average in noise level.

Five days training were made available altogether. On three of these days, and one night, Comdr. WEISS rode the ship and offered many valuable suggestions. Target group consisted of FLORIKAN (ASR9) & RAMSEY(DH16). FLORIKAN was on his toes every minute and gave us a real workout. Three torpedoes were fired, all guns were fired at a towed target and all small arms tested. Night operations consisted of two practice approaches and one end-around. Two officers were detached by orders from higher authority. Lieutenant-Commander F.N. EDDY, USN, was ordered to ComSubDiv 141 for duty as a prospective Commanding Officer in Submarine Division 141 and on board submarines of that division, and Boatswain R.D. DICKERMAN, USN., was ordered to Submarine Base, New London for shore duty. Against these losses ComSubRon FOURTEEN supplied three officers, all recent sub-school graduates as follows:

Ensign J.A.L. HAHN, USNR-Comm. Officer.

Ensign J.I.C. ROSE, USNR - Asst. 1st Lieut.

Ensign V.H. HORGAN, USNR - Comsy Officer.

A total of 8 men were transferred to the Relief Crew for no other reason than to 'keep things moving', and one man, a dolt, was transferred to the tender after being temperamentally disqualified and reduced in rating. We had nursed this man, a first class petty officer, along since the ship was commissioned, taking away his responsibilities one by one until he ended up as an oiler. Even at this simple job he nearly caused a serious casualty to a main engine. We had no alternative. Twelve men, some new hands, some old hands, were supplied by the Relief Crew to fill vacancies. On board at start of Second War Patrol: 10 Officers, 77 Enlisted Men.

B) NARRATIVE:

16 NOVEMBER 1944:

1435 Underway from alongside USS BUSHNELL, MAJURO LAGOON, MARSHALL ISLANDS, in company with USS TREPANG(SS412) as unit of coordinated attack group under tactical command of Comdr. ROY H. DAVENPORT, USN., regularly assigned commanding officer of TREPANG; and consisting of TREPANG, RAZORBACK(SS334) & SEGUNDO. This group is known as ROY'S RANGERS. RAZORBACK is proceeding toward rendezvous from MIDWAY and will join TREPANG & SEGUNDO there.

1500 - 1615 Running measured mile inside MAJURO LAGOON.

1630 Took departure from CALALIN CHANNEL and set course for rendezvous which is itself along the course to SAIPAN. Escorted by RAMSEY (DM16) until 2400

17 -19 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute rendezvous with RAZORBACK. Conducted daily training dives and drills. Heavy weather.

Speed of advance 9 knots.

20 NOVEMBER 1944:

0653 Sighted RAZORBACK, who joined the formation. Set course for SAIPAN at a speed of advance of 14.5 knots.

0800 Changed ship's time to minus eleven zone.

21 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute SAIPAN in excellent weather. Conducted training dives and drills.

22 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute SAIPAN. Conducted training dives and drills.

0500 Changed ship's time to minus ten zone.

0800 Formed scouting line normal to course to SAIPAN, distance between ships seven miles, to search for downed airplane.

23 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute to SAIPAN, searching for downed airplane. Conducted training dives and drills.

24 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute SAIPAN, searching for downed airplane. Did not meet escort at 0600 as per schedule. Learned that escort had gone to wrong rendezvous, so milled around and killed time until new escort could arrive, during forenoon watched Superforts pass overhead on their way to TOKYO. He counted about eighty-five, but learned later at SAIPAN that the correct number was an even hundred. This was an impressive sight.

1200 Sighted destroyer through high periscope which turned out to be our escort, USS DUNLAP(DD334).

1243 Proceeded under escort of DUNLAP toward SAIPAN at 18.5 knots, disposed on a scouting line searching for same lost airplane.

1735 Passed one cadaver of the great YAMOTO tribe floating face downward.

1740 Passed through SAIPAN net entrance.

1825 Moored to starboard side of RAZORBACK in nest to starboard of USS FULTON. Comdr. BROCKHAN came on board at once to learn our meager requirements.

2000 Changed ship's time to minus nine zone.

25 NOVEMBER 1944:

At SAIPAN. During forenoon fueled ship, obtained repairs to wing antenna trunk, and topped off with water and provisions. RANGERS held an exhausting conference on Pack Doctrine, policy and operating procedure. It looks as if we will have a harmonious group of the old 'one for all, all for one' spirit. During afternoon shifted inboard to transfer to the FULTON an air torpedo with a defective main engine and to receive a new one in exchange. The FULTON was very accommodating in all respects.

1605 Got underway from alongside FULTON and stood out.

1639 Passed through net entrance and joined up with the other two RANGERS plus SPEARFISH(SS190), who accompanied us part way. Escorted by DUNLAP(DD384) until 2200. Set course for patrol area at speed of advance 13 knots.

26 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute area. Conducted training dives and drills. 1215 SPEARFISH sighted periscope and torpedoes. SEGUNDO, for one, inaugurated a more radical zig plan.

27 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute area. Conducted training dives and drills. SPEARFISH has departed formation. RANGERS disposition now is a scouting line normal to course, distance between ships 20 miles.

28 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute area. Made several training dives and held drills. Charged torpedoes forward.

2143 In position 20-46 N., 130-48 E., picked up SJ radar interference bearing 295(T). This interference has approximately the same PRF as ours, therefore is assumed to be friendly.

2225 Exchanged recognition signals with JALLAO(SS368). JALLAO was source of interference picked up at 2143. He have had very faint interference from astern, bearing 100(T) off and on since sunset. Believe this to be emanated by TREPANG; at any rate we can tell by PRF that it is friendly.

29 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute area. Made several training dives and held drills. Charged torpedoes in racks forward.

1735 Picked up SJ radar interference from astern, bearing 102(T). This was apparently from the same source as last night and was considered to be from TREPANG. PRF checks friendly. He continued to have this interference off and on until around midnight, at which time it was lost and not regained during the night.

30 NOVEMBER 1944:

Enroute area. Moon is full tonight, and it is very bright. The visibility is unlimited in all directions. The sea is state three. Charged torpedoes in tubes forward

0330 In position Lat.20-51 N., Long. 124-50 E., picked up SJ radar interference bearing 212(T), and having a friendly PRF.

0340 Exchanged recognition signals with MUSKALLUNGE(SS262), who was the source of this interference.

0700 Entered assigned area and continued on course for assigned lane. Our course is set for BALINTANG ISLAND.

0807 Submerged for the day.

1500 Changed ship's time to minus eight zone.

1758 Surfaced. Continued on course for BALINTANG ISLAND.

2100 Entered patrol lane assigned for December 1st, 2nd 4 3rd.

1 DECEMBER 1944:

0051 Sighted BALINTANG ISLAND, distance 20 miles,

0451 Standing a receiver watch on SJ radar, translating secured, picked up weak interference astern as on previous nights. PRF indicates friendly, but what ship is not known. Both TREPANG & RAZORBACK are due to be south of us.

0503 SJ radar interference from the southward.

0527 Submerged for the day.

100S Sighted large airplane at a range of about 20 miles that looked like a MAVIS. He appeared to be on an anti-sub patrol. Aircraft contact #1.

1245 In position ten miles to eastward of BALINTANG ISLAND. Sound reported possible pinging bearing 310 to 320(T), and shortly thereafter the JP sound man reported screws in that direction. We came up to 53 ft.; but could see nothing. At

1252 we sighted a large airplane coming from that bearing and moving southward toward BALINTANG, followed at 1316 by another plane resembling a BETTY. At

1330 sound reported they definitely had pinging on bearing 310 to 320(T) and JP was at this time sure of his screws. Up to now the bearing had not changed and it appeared that the ships were going to pass to the eastward of BALINTANG. We still could not see anything, not even smoke. Two planes were taking sweeps back and forth far to the left of the sound of the ships. Starting at 1330 the pings commenced to draw to the left and since we still could not see anything it became apparent that the ships had changed base course and were going to pass to the westward of BALINTANG. By

1350 we had seven planes in sight identified partially as follows: 2 RUFES, 2 BETTYS, 3 single-engine low wing heavy planes not identified. All the planes were conducting a rather thorough systematic search, the heavy ones ranging far and wide. This change of base course has put BALINTANG between us and the convoy. To succeed in an end-around seems impossible on account of the fact that the air cover will require us to wait awhile before surfacing, then we will have to go around BABUYAN ISLAND as well as BALINTANG. By this time the ships will be at anchor in CALAYAN. If we try to cut corners we will be sighted, the visibility is perfect and seas are nearly flat, and

the convoy will be alerted and may ruin the chances of TREPANG & RAZOREACK, who are to the southward of us. It appears that the best thing to do is to maintain the status quo and try to catch them along the north coast of LUZON tomorrow. At

1415 we sighted the tips of two masts of a freighter and a wisp of smoke from another ship bearing 265(T), which meant they had 'gotten by'. This was the only sighting of the day and even this soon disappeared. At

1525 we saw the last of the planes and at about the same time lost the convoy on sound.

1810 Surfaced. As soon as ships sked was finished sent contact report to TREPANG & RAZORBACK and suggested trying to regain contact along north coast of LUZON tomorrow.

1331 Received attack report from RAZORBACK saying she had fired at one AK and one AP out of the convoy. This takes us feel a lot better, although she did not state results.

2. DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling BALINTANG CHANNEL.

0323 APR contact on 150 MGS, submerged. Plane not sighted. Aircraft contact #3

0413 Surfaced. Seas are making up.

0530 Submerged for the day. The sea is state five with intermittent bad visibility. We are cruising at 100 ft., coming up for a look every 20 mins., and having a hard time holding the boat at periscope depth at two-thirds speed.

1757 Surfaced. Patrolled BALINTANG Channel. to westward of BALINTANG ISLAND. Curreant is 3.5 knots setting about 300(T).

2140 APR contact 150 MGS, weak, faded. Aircraft contact #4.

2213 APR contact back again, getting stronger and being keyed.

2215 Submerged for APR contact, plane not sighted.

2315 Surfaced.

3 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling BALINTANG CHANNEL to westward of BALINTANG ISLAND. Sea is heavy, state five or six; wind is gale strength. Moon is bright with good visibility except when raining.

0351 APR contact, 150 MGS, weak. Aircraft contact #5.

0354 Submerged. APR signal coming in strong.

0501 Surfaced.

0529 Submerged for the day.

1807 Surfaced. Heavy seas.

1835 Received a flash of SJ radar interference from the southward. Did not have a chance to check the PRF.

2207 APR contact, 150 MGS, weak. This contact faded until 2242, faded again, and then came in strong at 2300. Aircraft contact #6.

2300 Submerged for APR contact. Plane not sighted.

2359 Surfaced.

4 DECEMBER 1944:

Shifted patrol lane tonight. Now patrolling across the direct route between FORMOSA & LUZON about halfway between them. No change in the weather except maybe for the worse. Seas are heavy and wind is gale strength. Driving rains come about twice per hr.

0511 Submerged for the day

1745 Surfaced. No change in the weather; third day of overcast

1840 Received message #2 from TREPANG saying to proceed to sub-area sixteen. We are now in sub-area sixteen and have been for nearly 24 hrs. His message #1, which we do not have and which we did not receipt for would no doubt clarify matters. However, since we have carried out the orders of his latest message, we decided not to ask for a repeat of his first transmission, It is pitch black tonight. The overcast is so thick that the moon's illumination after it rose at 2116 does not brighten up the sky.

5 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling across a line connecting TAKAO & BOJEADOR at about the halfway mark. The night is dark and rainy. A three-quarter soon is blacked out by a heavy overcast. Seas are state six and wind is gale strength. This is the beginning of the fourth day of this kind of weather.

0313 SJ radar interference bearing southward; assumed to be TREPANG.

0553 Submerged for the day.

100C Surfaced for sun line. Two SD radar contacts, 11 and 12 miles. These contacts disappeared after about thirty seconds.

1005 SD radar contact, 12 miles, closing. Dove. Aircraft contact #7.

1753 Commenced shifting patrol lanes.

1800 Picked up SJ radar interference to the northward. If it is the TREPANG one of us is out of position as SEGUNDO is supposed to be northern lost ship.

1835 It is TREPANG. We have been allowing for a current of 1.5 knots, setting 315 as shown in all our current diagrams and apparently she has not. At this time we asked her for a repeat of her message number one which last night; we found we had missed. She told us to disregard it.

2243 Three pips on SJ at about 34,000 yds. They looked peculiar,

2250 Manned battle stations and commenced closing at flank speed. Soon after going to battle stations the radar officer and the technician concluded that the contacts were secondary pips on the peaks of LUZON some 140,000 yds. away. Most phenomenal! We know our SJ is working.

6 DECEMBER 1944:

Enroute to new patrol lane bounded on the south by LUZON and on the east by FUGA ISLAND & DALUPIRI ISLAND. As we hove into the lee of these islands the seas abated to state three and the wind called down. 0409 Friendly SJ radar interference bearing 336(T); considered to be TREPANG

0525 Submerged and commenced patrolling the western entrance of BABUYAN CHANNEL and the approaches to MUSA ANCHORAGE. The sea is calm and visibility in all directions is unlimited. The first decent weather in four days.

1045 Sighted MAVIS flying boat about 12 mi. on port beam headed in.

1047 Went deep. Aircraft contact #7.

1138 Sighted mast of small sailing vessel in the direction of left tangent of LUZON.

1140 Caught in tide rips all the same as LOMBOK & SIBUTU. On our eastern hand light green water, on our western hand dark blue water; and the bottom dropping out of depth control.

1238 Sighted first of five small vessels, three sailing luggers, one auxiliary trawler, and a Jap junk. All of them came out of the passage between FUGA & DALUPIRI ISLANDS, proceeded along the hundred fathom curve, but as near as near as we could take out, outside of it, across the entrance to BABUYAN CHANNEL, then westward along hundred fathom curve off LUZON. We decided against using the guns on them mainly because the first four looked to be Filipino and because we didn't want to give our presence away. However, it was a big temptation not to go after #5, the Junk; in view of the big rising sun he had painted on his side. At 1410 these boats were lost to view and we headed west to keep out of BABUYAN CHANNEL. We were 3 mi. away at this time and stayed in the same spot for the next four hours heading into the flood tide.

1804 Surfaced.

1828 SJ radar interference bearing 296(T). Considered to be TREPANG.

1858 Headed south to look into PASALONG BAY.

1950 About three mi. off PASALONG BAY and eight mi. from its deepest part; no targets. Changed course to west proceeding along the coast.

1953 Received contact report from TREPANG giving complete details on a five large ship and two small ship convoy. This convoy later turned out to consist of ten ships with four escorts. From positions of convoy and of TREPANG determined that we would be starboard flanker. At 2006 received message from TREPANG changing convoy base course to 125(T). This course heads them for MUSA ANCHORAGE or for the passage between FUGA & DALUPIRI. At 2020 had SJ interference on TREPANG at 332(T). Went ahead full speed, set course 290(T) to take position as starboard flanker and manned battle stations. At 2046 made radar contact bearing 359(T). range 25,000 yds. Changed course to north and commenced tracking. Notified TREPANG that we had made contact. No word from RAZORBACK yet. The night is dark and dirty, perfect condition for surface attack. We have the black background of LUZON at our back. The sea has whipped up to state five or six and the wind is now gale strength, The sea is a distinct disadvantage for us, the starboard flanker, as we will have to fire into it. The ship was pitching excessively for surface torpedo firing, but we decided to chance it since staying on the surface might take a second attack possible. We had target speed down pat and could therefore 'pull in' the spread to take care of broachings or erratics.

At 2057 observed at least two explosions, perhaps more, to the northward resulting from TREPANG'S first attack. Started in for our first attack with the biggest pip on the screen as our target. The convoy scattered after TREPANG'S attack and became somewhat separated. The target that we selected soon turned out to have another ship trailing it by about 15 degrees with an escort on the second ship's starboard quarter. Decided, however, since this was our virgin attack to concentrate on one target to be sure to get hit rather than try to swing and get them both. At range 3,000 yds. could take out target well enough for TBT bearings and could see that he was a big ship. He had a lot of freeboard and presented a long unbroken upper deck line like a carrier. He were never able to take the details of his silhouette well enough to positively identify him but since he was so big our best estimate was that he was a whaler-type tanker. This ship tracked at 15 knots for fourteen minutes after TREPANG'S attack, at which time he slowed to 9 knots for a few minutes. At time of firing he was tracking at 7 knots.

At 2135 commenced firing six mark eighteens on a 135 degree starboard track, torpedo run 2300 yds, gyros near zero. It is a wonder that any torpedoes could be fired into such a rough sea and take a normal run. Observed one hit at about 2138 and timed two hits below. One torpedo must have hit the engine or boiler room of this big ship for he remained stopped, or at speeds of zero to two knots, from the time we hit him until RAZORBACK polished hit off later. After firing we hauled clear to the westward and notified the other boats of completion of attack. The only account that can be made for failure to obtain more hits on this ship is that after firing the first two torpedoes, a haze closed over the target enough to keep us from using TBT bearings, requiring a shift to radar bearings. The radar officer reported that the ship made such a broad pip on the A-Scope that it was not possible to give bearings within three or four degrees accuracy. Again, it is possible that some of the torpedoes did not run straight on account of the sea. The unfavorable track had to be accepted as target appeared to have changed course to join the main body of the convoy which was re-forming to the eastward. However, plot reported that the target zigged back toward us while the torpedoes were on their way to him. We do not know what course he was on when hit, but we believe that the track was more favorable, probably around 105 degrees starboard.

Commenced reloading forward and continued to track our cripple at a range of 3,000 yds. He had stopped and was joined at 2150 by an escort. Much signaling back and forth between them. By the time that half the fish were reloaded forward, it was evident that this cripple was in a bad way as regards propulsion, that he would probably be perfectly safe sitting where he was until we could hit the main body again.

Accordingly at 2210 we started in for our second attack. Remnants of the convoy were getting nearer and nearer to MUSA ANCHORAGE and would be there in another hour. It was TREPANG'S turn to attack, but we thought it best not to wait. The convoy had completely reformed now except for the escorts which were proceeding from astern to take position ahead, one escort on each flank. A third escort was standing by our crippled tanker and the fourth was probably standing by one of TREPANG'S victims which was still burning. A few minutes of tracking showed that the convoy Comdr. had changed his mind about his destination, that instead of heading for the passage between DALUPIRI & FUGA ISLANDS, the convoy had changed base course to 150(T) heading for the center of BABUYAN CHANNEL. This lucky change of course gave us an additional half hour to work on them. We concentrated on three ships which were in line abreast or nearly so; there were at this time five ships in this particular detachment plus the two escorts. We attempted to gain position for a ninety track to fire at the overlapping target they presented. Sure enough just before firing they made a small zig to the left and showed us an overlapping target with a 105 starboard track. The sea was just as rough or rougher now than it had been for our first attack so we deliberately kept the spread small to take care of any torpedoes that might run erratic or broach. At 2258 with torpedo run to nearest target, 1,000 yds, to center target 1,400 yds, and to far target about 1,800 yds, track angle 105 degrees starboard, commenced firing bow tubes at center ship with a six hundred foot spread. At about 2300 the near ship blew up in our faces. This was the quickest, most terrific, most devastating, explosion imaginable. After about 10 seconds of seething flame and flying chunks of ship, there remained, where before had been a perfectly good ship in plan view, only short licks of flame defining a plan view of the ship on the surface of the water, On the bridge we could not believe our eyes, it just did not seem possible that anything could be obliterated so instantaneously. No doubt we were sort of stunned by the flash ourselves, too stunned to be mindful of the assorted pieces of ship that were splashing in the water all about us. Below decks they were rocked and jarred quite considerably. A couple of the old hands said 'Ammunition Ship' when she blew. We on the bridge sort of lost track of what was going on at this time and consequently could not verify with our own eyes what other damage was done. The starboard lookout stated that he saw other torpedoes hit just after the ammunition ship blew up. Down below most people stated they heard four hits, with some, including the Executive Officer, saying five. At any rate,

while we were hauling clear to the westward, the radar pip that had been the largest of the lot, the center ship and point of aim, commenced to grow smaller at 1600 yds. range and disappeared entirely at 3300 yds. range.

We had the other two on the radar until we had opened to 12,000 yds., at which time we stopped tracking them and shifted back to our cripple. The O.O.D. got a good look at the ship which blew up just before she disintegrated and he has identified her as being similar to the HANSEI MARU, shown on page 192 of ONI 208-J(revised). She was a flush decker with split superstructure. The center ship was not seen well enough to be identified, but from all appearances she was probably about the same size as the ammunition ship, if not larger. On the radar screen she looked larger. We now turned our attention back to our cripple. He was tracking on course 180(T), apparently intent on beaching himself on LUZON, with his escort circling him. We intended to reload the four retaining torpedoes forward, just in case, but to fire the stern tubes since we still had eight torpedoes aft.

At 2326 there were big explosions in TREPANG'S direction which necessitated our turning away momentarily until all misses had exploded, When this was over we resumed the approach on our cripple, just a little concerned about getting SJ radar interference on the other side of him; the thought flashed through our minds that maybe RAZORBACK will snatch our ship right from under our noses. At 2347, when we were but 6,000 yds. away, two and possibly three torpedo hits were observed in this ship; RAZORBACK had beat us to him. These hits set him on fire and he continued to burn furiously and fiercely until lost from sight at 0230. Periodically the fires flared up much more intensely than the steady level. By 0015 he was on fire from stem to stern and settling in the water. He most certainly can be considered a loss for the Japanese. For the RAZORBACK to steal our rich prize was a heart-rending disappointment to the fire control party and most of the crew. The torpedo officer says he will never like the RAZORBACK again. After getting clear of RAZORBACK'S misses with not too much room to spare we closed TREPANG to 4500 yds. and exchanged notes via SJ radar. She said she had sunk four ships, which with our two sunk and one damaged, later hard hit and set on fire by RAZORBACK, accounted for seven ships. Three got away. SEGUNDO could have possibly gotten in one more attack if we had not wanted to sink our sitting duck so badly.

This action has completely sold us on Wolf packs. It was a submariner's dream. Fires and explosions all over the place, escorts going wild. The timing was perfect, communications perfect, left nothing to be desired in fact except perhaps chagrin that three ships got away We would have batted close to 100 percent had RAZORBACK been closer to scene at the start. Comdr. DAVENPORT deserves a big hand for the way he has run this pack ever since it was formed and he gets it from SEGUNDO.

7 DECEMBER 1944:

Surveying one particular spot of LUZON STRAIT that at this moment most certainly belongs to the U.S.A. At about 0030 two escorts came out to the burning ship from BABUYAN CHANNEL. At 0117 we secured from battle stations. At 0347 we received RAZORBACK'S report of damage inflicted. She called our big sitting duck a transport. Since she should have gotten a good look at it, it being brightly illuminated for her by its own fires, and since we did not get a good look at it, it seems safe to assume that RAZORBACK is right.

And now a word in retrospect. The sea is now a good state six and the wind is back to gale strength. To the best of our knowledge and belief the escort that stood by her from the time we stopped her until RAZORBACK set her on fire never did get alongside. Several times he got pretty close, but there was always some water in between. From the moment RAZORBACK'S torpedoes hit, the ship burst into flame and inside of fifteen minutes was burning from stem to stern. Having this mind and judging from the state of the sea, it appears that it is safe to say that there were few, if any, survivors from this big transport.

0500 Submerged for the day. SJ radar out of commission for four hours because of a bad condenser and two tubes burned out in the power supply.

1643 Surfaced. The sea is really rough. We have to choose our course to keep the sea forward of the beam to keep from getting pooped, finally headed right into it and made 90 turns, the turns for 7 knots, and logged 1.8 knots the rest of the night.

1324 SJ radar interference to NNE.

1930 SJ radar interference to E.

8 DECEMBER 1944:

Battling the north monsoon at its worst.

0520 Submerged for the day. Made periscope exposures every thirty minutes, as it was hard to hold the boat at 60 ft.

0630 Gyro repeater system out of commission for one and one half hours.

1745 Starboard sound head out of commission; cables carried away. This is the second time this patrol that this casualty has occurred. We are investigating for the source of the trouble.

1754 Surfaced. No let-up in the weather. Headed southeast, with the seas on our port beam, toward land to get a fix. At about 2100 we received orders for the RANGERS. SEGUNDO, with 12 torpedoes, is to remain on station, conducting an independent patrol. TREPANG with two torpedoes, is to terminate patrol and proceed to Pearl for refit. RAZORBACK, with four torpedoes, is to proceed to Saipan for a reload and rejoin us later. It is a shame that this smooth working team has to be broken up.

9 DECEMBER 1944:

Still fighting the north monsoon, heading toward land for a fix.

0153 Made radar contact on LUZON and at 0235 made contact on DALUPIRI ISLAND. At 0330, having established our position, headed west to patrol the high speed convoy lanes between FORMOSA and the "Southern Empire".

0533 Submerged for the day. Starboard sound head back in commission.

1824 Surfaced. Seas and wind are the same, if not worse. Continued on westerly course toward 20 N., 118-30 E.

1923 Made SJ radar contact bearing 041(T), range 7,150 yds. Went to battle stations as pip was reported to be clear and well-defined. However, the pip was lost a few minutes later and not regained although we headed in its direction for a couple of miles. Radar Officer considered that the contact was on a big wave. No radar interference was encountered from this contact.

2153 The following named man was lost overboard while serving in line of duty as port lookout: SAUNDERS, G.H., 825 77 30, F1/C, V6, USNR. All efforts to recover this man were to no avail. At 2153 the ship took a sudden and heavy lurch to port estimated to have been about 35 degrees. The wave that caused this roll then broke against the periscope shears and SAUNDERS was knocked from the lookout platform and fell into the sea hitting the side of the ship as he fell. The after lookout saw the man go over and gave the alarm at once. The C.O., who was sitting in the conning tower, ordered the screws stopped just a moment ahead of the OOD, went to the bridge, and assumed the conn. A float light was thrown over to port within one ship length of the man. This light worked very well. Since ship's speed was only 8 knots and wind was favorable for backing, the ship was backed first on both shafts until stern way had been gained, then on the starboard shaft on a twenty degree divergence to the reverse of the original course. When abreast of the float light an 8 inch portable search light was used to search the waters on both sides of the ship for a period of about thirty minutes. The ship was backed on its nearly opposite course for about five ship lengths beyond the float light, then kicked ahead and the float light was circled close aboard two times just in case the man had been able to swim to it.

Search was abandoned thirty-seven minutes after man went over the side. It did not appear to be possible for even the strongest of swimmers to remain afloat in those roaring, breaking, tumultuous seas. Although you do everything you can there remains an empty feeling inside - "so near and yet so far away". At 2330 all hands not on watch attended short burial at sea services for our lost shipmate.

10 DECEMBER 1944:

Headed toward lat. 20 N., long. 118-30' E. for today's patrol. The sea is state seven. All hull openings closed except C.T. hatch, main induction, and after engine room induction flapper.

0557 Submerged for the day. Would like to conduct a surface patrol here but since it takes two to three minutes to dive, do not think it is advisable.

0609 Both JP & JK sound gear picked up screws bearing 063(R), 018(T). Went to battle stations and came up to 60 ft. but could see nothing. The contact was soon lost on sound also. This peculiar occurrence, coupled with the freak radar contact last night takes us wonder if there is not another submarine around. As far as we know there are no friendly ones.

1804 Surfaced. The sea has subsided to state five.

1839 SJ radar interference bearing N.E. We had this same source of interference the rest of the night. Although repeated attempts were made to exchange recognition signals with him it was not until 0145 that we were successful.

11 DECEMBER 1944:

0145 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with USS CAIMAN (SS323) via SJ radar.

0523 Headed into the sea at slow speed and shifted ventilation outboard to give the ship a good airing before diving.

0608 Submerged for the day. The sea has increased to the customary state six.

1757 Surfaced. The weather is better although there is still a heavy overcast. Received ComSubPac dispatch authorizing FENNOMINTS to retain in this area west of long, 116 E. until 22 Deceiver.

12 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling at slow speed in the vicinity of lat. 13.00' N., long. 117-30' E. Skies are overcast for the sixth consecutive day, but sea has dropped to state four. No moon, very dark and murky.

0607 Submerged for the day.

1757 Surfaced. Sea is state five.

2112 SJ radar out of commission for one and one half hours, because of bad tubes. See section (H).

13 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling in vicinity of lat. 19 N., long. 117 E. Skies are overcast for seventh straight day.

0015 Greased the topside. Took every possible precaution such as stopping the ship and holding her head into the wind and sea; equipped the team with water tight flashlights, whistles and life belts; kept a line secured to the man working the grease gun. The team got good and wet, and lost one gun over the side, but suffered no harm. Administered brandy when job was done. Since we lost the lookout over the side a few nights ago, we have kept a supply of whistles hanging in the control room for use of lookouts. It is on a voluntary basis entirely, but most of them put one around their necks before going on the bridge. Next time in port we will try to draw some of the small "man-lights" that have been so valuable in locating survivors of surface ship sinkings.

0621 Submerged for the day.

0731 Surfaced for sun line.

0739 Submerged.

1201 Surfaced for sun line.

1205 Submerged.

1750 Surfaced. Wind and sea have abated somewhat; now state five.

14 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling at slow speed at the intersection of SINGAPORE - TAKAO & HONG KONG - MANILA trade routes. Night is dark and murky with thick overcast. Sea is state five.

0645 Submerged for the day.

1757 Surfaced. Sea is still rough.

After surfacing received contact report from BASHAW regarding two battleships, 1 light cruiser, and five destroyers, speed 19, course 020(T).

15 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling in vicinity of lat. 19 N., long. 115-30' E. Sea is state five or six.

0640 Submerged for the day in the most favorable position to intercept battleships reported last night by BASHAW, if they come through this area.

16 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling vicinity of lat. 18-30' N., long. 116-50' E, Light airs, nearly calm sea, all the stars are out; most unusual weather. During the early morning we picked up SJ radar interference on three bearings, 080(T), 260(T), and 160(T). All weak and sweeping

0530 Very abruptly the north monsoon descended again. Inside of half an hour the sea increased to state six and the rains came.

0655 Submerged for the day. Visibility zero.

1810 Surfaced.

1836 Picked up SJ radar interference from S.H., weak.

17 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling at slow speed in vicinity of lat. 18-45' N., long. 117 E. The sea is state six and skies are overcast; the night is dark and murky.

0607 SJ radar interference from southward.

0643 Submerged.

1600 Surfaced. No change in the weather.

2107 Electrical fire of slight consequence in starter panel for #1 vapor compression still, forward engine room. Renewed one holding down coil in this panel and it was back in operation. Fire under control at 2110

18 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling vicinity of lat. 19 N., long. 117-30' E. at slow speed. Sea is state five, skies are overcast, and the new moon is hidden.

0826 Submerged.

1006 Surfaced.

1237 Submerged.

1812 Surfaced. No change in weather.

Received orders from ComSubPac to join pack 114, REBEL LOHRANCE'S ROGUES on the twentieth. Later in the night received orders from SEADOG assigning patrol station in vicinity of lat. 18-30' N., long. 118.00' E. We are now at lat. 19.00' N., long. 118-00' E.

19 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling vicinity of lat. 19 N., long. 117-45' E., at slow speed. The sea is state five, skies are overcast and we pass through a rain squall about every ten minutes.

0843 Submerged.

1751 Surfaced. The sea has picked up to state six.

1840 Exercised crew at battle stations.

1945 Dove to 40 ft. for practice in rough sea. Depth control very difficult.

2019 Surfaced.

2025 Secured from battle stations.

2110 Picked up SJ interference bearing 050(T).

2115 Exchanged recognition signals and call signs with SEAROBIN which is one of REBEL'S ROGUES with whom we will be working for the next few days.

20 DECEMBER 1944:

Patrolling vicinity of lat. 18-45' N., long. 117-45' E., at slow speed in a state six sea. The moon is in the first quarter, but is usually obscured by a thick overcast. REBEL'S ROGUES consisting of SEADOG, SEAROBIN, & GUARDFISH, are nearby, and we will join them to form a scouting line as directed by ComSubPac at daylight.

0700 In position on scouting line at lat. 18-30' N., long. 118-00' E. The line is disposed along lat. 18-30' N., with ten miles between ships. We are maintaining a stationary patrol.

0833 Submerged.

1805 Surfaced. Navigator was able to get decent stars for the first time in ten days. The sea is more like state seven now than state six.

1812 The first of much radar interference from the ROSUES.

21 DECEMBER 1944:

In position lat. 18-30' N., long. 118-00' E., on an east-west scouting line with SEADOG, SEAROBIN & GUARDFISH. Ten miles between ships; we are westernmost ship. The sea is state seven and the night is dark and overcast. 0007 Sighted submarine bearing 225(R), angle on bow about 30 port, distance about 300 yds. Went to flank speed, put stern towards, and had the satisfaction of seeing him cross our wake about 200 yds. astern on a 90 port track. We were in an ideal situation for a shot at him, had he been enemy, but it was plainly apparent that this one was a product of the U.S.A. This submarine could have been either SEAROBIN, who was patrolling the station adjacent to ours, or SEALION, who was passing through our area enroute SoWesPac. Attempts to exchange calls via SJ radar were not successful

Following this near collision we revised our SJ sweep procedure. Wave echos were coming in to seventy-five hundred yds., taking it hard to pick up small ships, which normally come in at eight or nine thousand yds., while using the system at several sweeps every five minutes. We commenced sweeping constantly on the eight thousand yd. scale, but making two sweeps on the forty and two on the twenty-seven thousand yd. scale every three minutes. Apparently SEAROBIN (OR SEALION) was having the same trouble with wave echoes, as there was no indication from them that she even saw us.

0125 Lost submarine on SJ at a range of 8,500 yds. It's easier to track them out than track them in.

0306 False contact on SJ in the wave echoes.

0330 Received order from CTG#14 releasing us from scouting line and duty with his ROGUES.

0627 Sighted friendly submarine through periscope. Thought to be SEADOG.

0708 Submerged.

1801 Surfaced. No change in the weather.

1958 Received SJ radar interference bearing 027(T).

22 DECEMBER 1944:

Proceeding from scouting line to new area south of FORMOSA at maximum speed consistent with a state seven sea, eight knots. Approximate position at zero hours is lat. 18-58' N., long. 118-20' E. Sky is overcast as usual.

0704 SD contact at 20 miles. There are low clouds all around; lookouts do not have binoculars as it is too wet.

0705 SD contacts at 20 miles and at 12 miles; closing. Submerged. About two and a half minutes were required. Aircraft contact #8. At time of diving for these planes we were in the process of receiving ComSubPac 211855 for action ROGUES, SEGUNDO & RAZORBACK The last thirty groups were tossed, but we got enough of it to understand the general idea. He had anticipated the information it contained and had acted accordingly.

1800 Surfaced. Resumed beating into the sea to the northward.

2223 Received message from RAZORBACK reporting back in area from SAIPAN.

2357 Transited patrol instructions to RAZORBACK, telling her to follow original schedule of RANGERS, except for her to take TREPANG'S lanes in order that there may be no gap. No receipt for this message. Re-transmitted at 0239 and 0345, but still no receipt.

23 DECEMBER 1944:

Proceeding into heavy sea enroute to new area south of FORMOSA. The sea is rough and the night is dark and overcast.

0003 Submerged for APR contact. Aircraft contact #9.

0039 Surfaced.

0100 Submerged for APR contact. Aircraft contact #10.

G2I9 Surfaced.

0524 Ship contact #3. Two SJ contacts bearing 114.5(T), range 11,650 and 12,050 yds. Went to battle stations and commenced closing. Contact developed into three ships, speed 10 knots, base course 240(T); it was difficult to track them at more than 10,000 yds. and the size of pips indicated they were small. Commenced an end-around at flank speed to take advantage of all the darkness we had left. At 0600, about one half hour before sunrise, we still were not able to see them, and they commenced tracking at 20 knots and pulling away from us. Continued to track until 0522 at which time they disappeared from the radar screen. The visibility was low, probably not over 8,000 yds. These ships are believed to have been sub-chasers or other similar small craft.

0640 Submerge and secured from battle stations.

1205 While at 55 ft. sighted a single mast bearing 228(T). This soon developed into a friendly submarine with a 20 degree port angle on the bow. At 1300 surfaced to exchange calls with this submarine, turning our starboard beam to him to indicate our friendly nature, and with the range to him about 4,000 yds. Tried communicating by light without success.

1306 Exchanged recognition signals and calls via SJ radar with SEACAT.

1325 Submerged.

1805 Surfaced. The sea has abated to state five. Set course for tomorrow's patrol station on the GARANBI-SABTANG route at twelve knots.

1829 Picked up SJ radar interference bearing 290(T), and kept it for remainder of the night.

2215 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with PIPEFISH, which is source of interference.

24 DECEMBER 1944:

Proceeding at two engine speed in a state five sea to patrol station the GARANBI - SABTANG route. Sky is completely overcast as usual.

0608 Submerged on the above mentioned shipping lane.

0945 Ship contact #4. Sighted smoke and two masts bearing 290(T) hauling right.

0346 Went to battle stations, came to normal approach course, and commenced high speed approach. On next look at 0957 contact had developed into masts of five ships, which could not be seen on account of low visibility. At this time it was seen that the ships were now hauling left with quite a good opening between masts. Came around to normal approach course for a port track and continued to run at high speed. The bearing was now changing to the left so fast that it appeared to be doubtful whether we would be able to get in or not.

By 1100 the range had been closed to approximately 9,000 yds; where three small subchasers and patrol chaser escorts could be seen. Four escorts could be heard pinging. Convoy consisted of two

large composite superstructure freighters and three medium modern flush deck freighters. Continued the approach in case they changed course toward us, although it appeared they had definitely gotten by.

At 1137 the escorts could no longer be seen and the convoy was hull down. Began to consider what best to do. Was aided in planning by a sudden lift in visibility that showed us to be much closer to ITBAYAT & MABUDIS ISLANDS than we thought, in fact it explained why the convoy had passed out of range. The masts of the big ships showed that they were proceeding toward SABBANG about 8 to 10 mi. off the island of ITBAYAT. We were to the northeastward of them. To end-around to the eastward would carry us too close to the island. To end-around to the westward would not leave time enough to take and approach prior to their reaching SABBANG. The only course of action retaining was to try to catch them coming out of SABBANG.

Accordingly, at

1235 surfaced and commenced running at flank speed toward the southern side of SABBANG ANCHORAGE, at the same time opening the range on the convoy, which we had in sight in the periscope, but not from the bridge. There was no air coverage for this convoy. We fully expected to be forced down by planes a couple of times even so but, much to our surprise, were not until just after sunset.

1315 Slowed to full speed and started a battery charge.

1730 Experienced an effective sort of jamming of the SD radar and at 1736 dove for a pip on same. This may or may not have been a contact, as it was soon discovered that the "jamming" was nothing more than "too much grass". Someone had unknowingly turned up the sensitivity knob. However, the pip seemed real enough. Aircraft contact #11.

1810 Surfaced and commenced patrolling the southern approaches to SABBANG from 10 to 20 miles west of BALINTANG ISLAND. We figured that the convoy would have had to make good more than twelve knots to have gotten by us. The reason for beating it down to this position was to be able to intercept the ships in case they passed through or by SABBANG instead of anchoring overnight.

1810 As soon as the China schedule was finished, sent contact report to RAZORBACK, and gave them our interception position. At 1925 picked up interference on SJ radar that did not appear to have been caused by an SJ. Weak and sweeping fast.

2050 Got radar contact on three ships bunched closely together, bearing 309(T), range 8,400 yds. This soon developed into five ships - a convoy of three and two escorts. Ship contact #5. Estimate of the situation here was as follows:

(1) Could possibly be the three medium AKs of our morning convoy continuing onward. The two large AKs and one or possibly two escorts having anchored.

(2) Position of contact jibes exactly with where the convoy should have been at a speed of advance of 8 knots.

(3) The short initial range indicates that targets are smaller than the medium AKs of the morning convoy, these ships having been lost on radar at 17,400 yds. after surfacing this morning.

2055 Went to battle stations and commenced tracking from ahead at about eight thousand yds. Has not able to see the ships on account of rain, although the night was very bright, there being a three quarter moon. Being very much in doubt as to the identity of this group, decided to lead them down to BABUYAN ISLAND, which we could use for a back drop while we looked them over. At about

2150 we stuck our bow in toward BABUYAN ISLAND, stopped, and 1st the ships steal across our stern. At a range of four thousand yds. the escorts were fairly well defined and were made to be either SCs or PCs, but the three ships of the convoy could not be made out clearly. As near as we could tell they were some type of infantry landing craft.

At 2233 went ahead again, tracking them on base course 130(T), speed 8 knots, and took position ahead. The sea had now picked up quite a bit, but the visibility toward the target was good. Has still not sure they were suitable torpedo targets, and especially so when the radar officer reported that the three landing craft were keeping station two hundred yds. apart.

At 2250 dove to 40 ft. and commenced submerged approach at radar depth. The boat was hard to hold even at five to six knots and we spent practically all the time either at 30 ft. or 60 ft. Went to periscope depth with the range 2,000 yds. At 2315 felt that it would be a waste of torpedoes to fire at these ships that could not be made out although nearly on top of us, so went down to 350 ft. It may have been that one of the frequent rainy drizzles happened to pass over at this time. No matter what the reason was, it was not possible to see

At 2358 came to periscope depth with the port flank escort, who had passed dead overhead, still on sound, but nothing in sight.

At 0001 secured from battle stations.

At 0016 surfaced and headed back for waiting point west of BALINTANG.

25 DECEMBER 1944:

At battle stations submerged after having withheld fire on a group of 3 ships considered to be too small for torpedoes in the sea and visibility conditions then prevailing.

0001 Secured from battle stations.

0016 Surfaced. Headed north for position 10 to 20 mi. westward of BALINTANG waiting for a convoy to come out of SABBANG ANCHORAGE.

0255 Arrived in desired position and commenced patrolling at slow speed on Easterly and Westerly courses from 10 to 20 mi. West of BALINTANG.

0442 APR contact at 153 MGS. Aircraft contact #12.

0443 Dove with above contact at half strength.

0656 Sighted BATAN or SABBANG ISLAND.

0705 Ship contact #6. Sighted smoke bearing 325(T). By

0715 had determined that the bearing was hauling left and could take out a set of masts. Went to battle stations, came around to normal approach course and commenced approach at high speed. We were in the direct path of anything going South from SABBANG between BABUYAN & CALAYAN ISLANDS and began to count our chickens. By

0800 it was seen that this convoy was the same as yesterday. At

0803 a MAVIS type flying boat was observed to be affording air cover for the convoy. Aircraft contact #13.

At about this time we also discovered that we were not closing the range very fast and that the bearing was drawing left more than it should. It seemed fairly certain that the convoy was taking a feint to the Westward to discourage such people as us. We still expected them to come back and head South to the Eastward of CALAYAN because every convoy that ever went via the Island chain from FORMOSA to LUZON went that way, but we were to be fooled this day. At

0843 we were as close as we ever got, about 6,000 yds. The visibility was bad, one drizzle after another having interfered with taking ranges and estimating angles, During this look a ship new to the convoy was sighted, one having all the appearances of a submarine, but with his decks forward and aft loaded with packing crates of the same size and shape. Could it be that this was a cargo submarine with the rubber-covered deck cargo traveling in a convoy? Perhaps he was the source of the peculiar SJ interference we picked up at 1925 last night, In spite of feeling in my own mind that they had gotten by, we continued to try to close the range at high speed just in case they did come back to pass to the eastward of CALAYAN.

By 0940 they were definitely going over the hill on a base course of 210(T) which would take them across CALAYAN BANK. Again we were on the wrong side, being to the Eastward, where CALAYAN ISLAND effectively blocked an end-around. To have made an end-around to Westward of the convoy would have required about five knots more speed than we have. It looked like the best thing for us to do was to hope that they anchored overnight at MUSA ANCHORAGE and try again on the morrow.

1010 Secured from battle stations. It seemed that our ships were taking an excessively long time to disappear over the horizon. At 1100 we still had masts in sight. In fact by

1130 we were seeing more mast instead of less mast By

1150 we were able to see stacks and superstructure. They must be coming back we thought. Perhaps RAZORBACK got in on them. Went to battle stations. By

1200 it was seen that these ships did not belong to our other convoy, but were an entirely new convoy. There were two ships and two escorts; both ships were new small engines aft tankers, one about 3,000 tons was leading and the other about 1,500 tons was trailing. There was one PC boat out ahead and one SC on our flank. Both the tankers were very light, apparently empty, and were bobbing up and down quite handsomely. It did not take long to find out that these two ships were going to pull the same thing that the other convoy had pulled, skirt right around us. The first angle on the bow was ninety starboard, no angle on the bow was less than fifty starboard. Targets tracked at six knots on base course 0250(T), headed for SABBANG. During this approach we used standard speed instead of full because we had taken the gravity down to about

1165 during the previous long approach at full speed. It could not have made much difference as the least torpedo run we had was 3700 yds. anyway. The 3,000 ton tanker is shown on a plate following page 1830 of the

ONI WEEKLY of 5 Sept. 1944. The 1,500 ton tanker was shown in an ONI WEEKLY of earlier date, which we no longer have.

1316 Secured from battle stations, wondering just how it happens that on three submerged approaches we have been neatly and effectively skirted just outside of torpedo range.

1507 Sighted single engine plane similar to PETE. Aircraft contact #14.

1801 Surfaced. Our records show that there are no submarines in the area off the North coast of LUZON to attempt interception of the convoy we failed to get into this morning after it leaves MUSA ANCHORAGE.

1845 Sent message to RAZORBACK informing her of our intentions, information to any submarine in that area. Left it up to RAZORBACK as to whether or not she will join us there or remain in own area.

2020 APR contact at 153 MGS. Weak and sweeping. Aircraft contact #15.

2225 Received message from RAZORBACK saying that two medium marus on course zero two five headed for SBTANG had skirted them at 1130. This must have been the same ships as our second contact today. How it was possible for RAZORBACK to see these two ships without seeing the five ship convoy we do not know. RAZORBACK elected to patrol twenty-five miles Northwest of ITBAYAT tomorrow instead of going down to LUZON with us. This was probably the best arrangement as we know there are two ships at SBTANG headed North, while we are only guessing that the five ship convoy will anchor at MUSA tonight.

26 DECEMBER 1944:

Enroute to a position off HAYRAIRA POINT, NORTHERN LUZON, to attempt interception of a five ship convoy we believe to be anchored at SBTANG. The night is bright with nearly a full moon and the sea is rough as usual.

0155 Picked up LUZON on SJ radar bearing 186(T), range 60,000 yds.

0306 Arrived in desired position 15 mi. from HAYRAIRA POINT and 15 mi. from FUGA ISLAND. Had decided to patrol here until shortly before dawn leaving in time to run at high speed for a diving position 5 mi. off HAYRAIRA. This seemed to be the most logical place to wait for ships coming out of MUSA for BOJEADOR.

0430 Picked up SJ interference bearing 109(T), the direction of MUSA, of the same type experienced night before last, that is, weak and sweeping fast. Our radar officer insists that the Japs would not be able to sweep fast on account of their inferior antennas, but to the best of our knowledge and belief there were no other U.S. Subs in the vicinity. He were not able to get a PRF check on this interference because it appeared too infrequently.

0504 Changed course to South and commenced running for desired diving position 5 mi. off HAYRAIRA POINT.

0534 Two SJ contacts bearing 081o(T), range 17,400 yds. The following events of the day center about this radar contact. The contacts were very faint on the PPI and did not appear at all on the A-Scope; they did not even come in every sweep on PPI. Time at this point was very valuable, a quick decision being required. If these two contacts were genuine it meant that the convoy was going to try to out-wit us again by passing in deep water to the Northward of us, although it would seem that they would head directly for the hundred fathom curve after leaving MUSA. However, since the contacts were definitely present (off and on), the quick decision made was to develop them. In accordance with this decision, we changed course to the last bearing, 073o(T), and ran four mi. without regaining contact. THESE CONTACTS WERE NOT RAIN SQUALLS!

By 0555 we were satisfied that the contacts, whatever they were, were not genuine. As it was now quite light, dove the ship, and headed back for HAYRAIRA POINT.

0632 Ship contact #8. Picked up pinging bearing 145o(T), which was indeed an ill omen. It meant that the convoy was following the hundred fathom curve; it also meant that it was practically by already. The only satisfaction we could feel was that we had guessed right about the convoy anchoring at MUSA, which hadn't been hard at all. Nothing could be seen through the periscope, everything in the direction of LUZON being obscured by rain and mist. Visibility in that direction estimated at 12,000 yds, He were on course 210o(T), the best course for closing, so at 0632 commenced running at full speed. Went to battle stations. Nothing in sight at 0704, no screws on sound, but pinging had drawn to the right rapidly, went deep and back to full speed.

At 0735 took a look and sighted one subchaser very plainly within the range of visibility and the blur of a large ship just over the margin of visibility. Angle on bow of SC was 80 degrees starboard) angle on bow of whip 60 degrees or 120 degrees starboard. True bearing was now 130o.

Continued the approach, taking next look at 0750. On this look sighted one BETTY airplane to the Northwest, headed for the convoy and about one mile away. He was dipping his wings in some sort of signal to the subchaser, possibly to indicate he had made a sweep and all was well. Perhaps he was just arriving, Aircraft

contact #16. On this look also were close enough to see three ships; the subchaser, whose range was 6,000 yds; a patrol chaser, range unknown, and a big AK, the same one previously seen as a blur, range 8,400 yds. This ship was really big, it was with grave regret that we watched it disappear into the list around HAYRAIRA POINT.

0807 Secured from battle stations.

0828 Sighted MAVIS flying boat, low and close. Went deep. Aircraft contact #17. This airplane either had our position plotted or it was a very peculiar coincidence, for he flew back and forth parallel to the coast, passing right over us on each leg, for the next two hours. He had to go deep at 0828, 0306, 0928, and 1006, which shows he was right on the dot each time.

We were now a very disgusted, disappointed lot. We had made three long submerged approaches on this outfit without getting closer than six or seven thousand yards. Incidental to chasing them we had made one exceptionally lone night radar approach on some lesser game and another daylight approach on the medium and small AO. In both these incidental approaches the decision not to fire had been influenced by the thought that bigger game was at hand, so torpedoes should not be wasted, when actually we might have gotten a lucky hit on either one of them. The approach office' and fire control party had gotten a good work-out but the crew had gotten no satisfaction whatsoever. He tried to figure out an end-around before reaching SoWesPac territory, but there wasn't a chance. To have chased into SoWesPac territory would have taken us at least as far down as VIGAN, further, even; after the MAVIS held us down so long.

1804 Surfaced and set course for own area.

1845 APR contact at 153 MGS. Aircraft contact #18.

1350 Submerged with APR contact at saturation.

1941 Surfaced.

2030 While on course 015o(T), 15 degrees to the left of the sea, at 12 knots, taking spray over the bridge, but not water, the ship dove into two mountainous waves. The ship was able to partly recover from the first one, but the second one caught her in a dazed condition and submerged her to 36 ft., everything below the look-out platforms being under green water. The J.O.O.D. saw these waves coming and yelled to the lookouts to 'hang on'. His shout alerted the Quartermaster who jumped for the hatch and closed same as soon as a great volume of water began to pour in. At the same time 'Stop Engines" was rung up on the engine order telegraphs and Maneuvering tripped the engines. The throttleman on watch in the forward engine room could not close his induction flappers right away because the down pouring water swept him away, and considerable water was taken into this engine room. However, in the interim between the first wave and the really bad second wave he got both the engine induction flapper and the ship's ventilation supply flapper closed. Fortunately, the ship was all buttoned up by the time she dove under the second wave. Only a negligible amount of water was taken into the control room and no damage. Maneuvering Room flapper was shut; no water at all. After Engine Room was able to close their flapper promptly. Some water - no damage. Forward Engine Room - much water, slight damage to instrument panels and instruments, but no other damage. Ship's ventilation supply line caused the only real damage, pouring a large amount of water on the after battery compt. deck and into the radio room. Flooded out the TBL transmitter, the 1MC - 7MC announcing systems, and the R&K power pack. No water got to the after battery, but a lot of bunks were flooded out. It was with fear and trepidation that the conning tower hatch was opened. Scarcely expecting to find anyone at all left on the bridge; it was a great relief to find everyone present and accounted for. It is believed that the action of closing the hatch and shutting up the engine room« saved the ship fro» serious damage.

2146 The 1MC - 7MC systems back in commission, operating normality. Radiomen commenced working on the transmitter.

27 DECEMBER 1944:

Enroute own area from a fruitless chase that carried us down to the North coast of LUZON; proceeding at seven knots into a heavy sea of state seven. Clearing up grounds and repairing damage sustained when we took a lot of green water into the boat earlier in the evening. Sky overcast and position doubtful.

0600 Submerged.

1100 Surfaced for sun line in the heaviest and most confused sea the writer has seen in some tine. It is at least state eight.

1110 Radio transmitter back in commission. The only equipment not back in commission now is the RAK receiver and the Forward Engine Room resistance thermometer.

1114 Submerged.

1815 Surfaced. The sea has calmed down to state six generally, but periodically we dive into a series of two or three mountainous rollers like the ones that swamped us last night. For this reason we kept our speed down to about seven knots. There seems to be no chance of a fix and we need one bad.

1623 APR contact on 153 MGS. Aircraft contact #15.

1E25 Submerged with APR contact at half strength.

1852 Surfaced.

1321 Picked up SJ radar interference bearing 220o(T), weak and sweeping fast. Looks much like the same kind we experienced off SBTANG & MUSA. No opportunity to check PRF

2030 #1 H.P. air compressor back in commission.

2136 APR contact on 153 MGS. Aircraft contact #20.

2142 Submerged with APR contact at half strength.

2228 Surfaced.

2330 Sent message #4 to RAZORBACK giving our position and instructions to patrol independently until we reach regularly scheduled area on twenty-ninth. This message was receipted for promptly.

28 DECEMBER 1944:

Position doubtful but believe ourselves to be in vicinity of lat. 20-40 N., long. 121-21 E., proceeding at seven knots into a heavy sea toward desired patrol position off KOTO SHO. The night is very bright, but heavily overcast.

0209 Picked up friendly looking SJ radar interference bearing 078o(T).

0237 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with source of radar interference, via radar, which resolved to be RAZORBACK.

0550 APR contact on 153 MGS. Aircraft contact #21.

0555 Submerged on account of APR contact and half-light.

0716 Sighted three large unidentified aircraft coming in with zero angle on bow. Aircraft contact #22.

0719 Went to 100 ft. to avoid these planes.

1006 Sighted two RUFES with 45 degree port angle on bow which changed at a range of 3 mi. to a zero angle on bow. Went to 150. Aircraft contact #23.

1206 In position lat. 21-02 N., long. 121-11 E., O.O.D. sighted a floating mine through periscope on port beam, distance - without exaggeration - TEN FEET. Needless to say the O.O.D. was rendered speechless for a moment or two. When the C.O. got to the conning tower the mine was bearing dead on 180o(R), and looked as big as a house in low power. In high power the threads, wires, etc. on the horns were plainly visible as were such minor details as gaskets on handhole plates, etc. The mine was spherical, about 30 in. in diameter, was free of marine growth, but its paint had worn down to the red lead. It was not rusty. Only one horn was threaded. We wondered what we would do if the cable became ensnared in our props and commenced to reel in. Rough sea made keeping it in sight difficult, but it was not long before we ascertained that it was drawing aft and was being cast by the wind across our stern to the starboard quarter. At 1219, with the mine roughly a thousand yds. astern and no longer in view, surfaced and manned automatic weapons. Reversed course and ran somewhat over a mile; then came back to original course. Had traveled just about a mile in this direction when at 1253 an SD contact at eight mi. forced us down. Aircraft contact #24. It was slightly hazardous to search for a mine in such a rough sea as was then running, so gave up the search and retained submerged. Our reckoning of current, wind, etc., allows that this line probably was brought up from the vicinity of the BABUYAN ISLANDS. We know for a fact that at present the current is carrying it toward the coast of CHINA via FORMOSA STRAIT at a rate of 30 mi. per day. So it is probably just as well that we didn't sink it.

1359 SHIP CONTACT #9. Sighted two masts and smoke bearing 062(T), hauling left. Came to normal approach course and commenced approach. By 1440 this sighting had resolved into two whale-killer boats in column about a half mile apart, slow speed, on course 320(T). Both were smoking a good deal, and both had regular depth charge racks aft. Knocked off the approach at an estimated range of 4000 yds. Lost sight of them at 1545.

1816 Surfaced. Set course for BASHI CHANNEL and tomorrow's patrol station off KOTO SHO.

1915 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with RAZORBACK.

2041 APR contact at 153 MGS. Aircraft contact #25.

2043 Submerged with above APR contact at half strength.

2120 Surfaced. At this point we gave up the idea of trying to reach patrol station off KOTO SHO and decided instead to spend tomorrow on the SABBANG - BARANBI line. In view of contact report from BLENNY off west coast of LUZON on two medium oilers and two medium transports, loaded, headed Northward, this station should be as good as any. Since this outfit could pass through our area either the twenty-ninth or thirtieth, we will try to catch them the twenty-ninth and RAZORBACK the thirtieth^

29 DECEMBER 1945:

Patrolling the shipping route between GARANBI & SABBANG about twenty mi. west of ITBAYAT ISLAND in a heavy sea.

0454 APR contact at 153 MGS. Aircraft contact #25.

0455 Submerged. Rough sea.

1815 Surfaced. Rough sea. Set course for BASHI CHANNEL and thence to patrol station Northeast of KASHO TO.

2112 Picked up SJ radar interference bearing 003(1).

2150 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with KRAKEN(SS370).

2305 Lost radar contact on Y'ATT ISLAND.

30 DECEMBER 1945:

Proceeding across BASHI CHANNEL in a northerly direction toward days patrol station Northeastward of KASHO TO. The sea is rough and confused and the sky is bright, but overcast. The moon is full.

0044 APR contact at 153 MGS Aircraft contact #27.

0049 Submerged just Eastward of GADD ROCK.

0132 Surfaced.

0616 Submerged to patrol Eastward of KASHO TO. RAZORBACK, we thought is patrolling between KASHO TO & FORMOSA.

0845 Sighted KASHO TO well enough to get a fix on it.

1813 Surfaced.

1825 APR contact at 155 MGS, rather weak. Contact does not appear to be from aircraft radar. Commenced maneuvering to attempt location of set. We were not able to do much of this on account of a contact report from RAZORBACK, but it appeared that the signals were emanating from a location on KASHO TO. See Section (M).

Decoded two messages of importance to us. One was a contact report from RAZORBACK and the other was ComSubPac serial four eight containing orders for both ships to clear area, if possible to arrive lat. 23o N., long. 130o E. by 1500 Z January 1st. Being in the eastern part of the area allows us to remain another twelve hours at most and still have time to carry out these orders.

The contact report from RAZORBACK was on a convoy she had evidently sighted around sunset and may or may not have been the one originally reported by BLENNY. She reported being in position lat. 21-08 N., long. 121-25 E., enemy course 045o(T), speed 8 knots. This position puts us 120 mi. to the northward of the convoy. The course 045 degrees did not look right as it put the convoy on a course through BASHI CHANNEL, which seemed strange, but which, if our air/surface forces have been at work, was not beyond the realm of possibility. However, we thought it best to check up, as it appeared more likely the convoy was on course 345 degrees true headed for GARANBI. Came to course 160 degrees at 15 knots to arrive at the 0200 predicted position of the convoy by 2400. Then at 1950 commenced trying to get verification of the contact from RAZORBACK. Apparently, however, she had submerged for we heard nothing from her until 2248, although we called her every 15 minutes.

At 2248 RAZORBACK reported attack completed, enemy scattered, and that she was complying with ComSubPac's orders to clear area. Shortly after 2300 she reported having fired 22 torpedoes and sinking or damaging four ships out of a total of six. It looked plain enough that the show was over, but we continued toward our proposed interception point, not having anything better to do, and asked her for more information on the remnants of the convoy. At about 0035 she replied that she had lost contact at 2200 when the remaining ships were 12 mi. to the Westward of here; that enemy course was 354o(T). This information showed us that the show was over indeed,

that the remnants of the convoy were headed for GARAMBI and would be there long before we could possibly intercept them. was unfortunate that we did not evaluate the original contact more soundly. We should have assumed that the convoy was not headed for BASHI CHANNEL in the first place, but rather for GARAMBI. Had we done this we probably would have been able to render some assistance to RAZORBACK. Not that RAZORBACK did not do a fine job on her own, for she did. At 0042 set course for lat. 23o N., long. 130o E. at fourteen knots, the best speed we could possibly make into a pretty rough sea. Informed RAZORBACK of this and reassured ourselves that she had received the orders to depart area.

31 DECEMBER 1944:

In position lat. 22o N., long. 122o-05' E., searching for convoy that RAZORBACK has been attacking.

0042 Having found that there is no chance to make contact with convoy due to our searching for lat. 23o N., long. 130o E., in compliance with orders from ComSubPac to depart area.

1010 SD contact at 20 mi. steady. Aircraft contact #23

1015 SD contact disappeared.

1243 Slowed to 12 knots to allow RAZORBACK to catch up.

1901 Received DF report on Jap Maru or Patrol Boat, vicinity of lat. 22o N., long. 130o E. We will look for this fellow.

2354 Received orders from ComSubPac for both SEGUNDO & RAZORBACK to proceed to GUAM for refit; routing instructions included.

1 JANUARY 1945:

Enroute lat. 23o N., long. 130o E., thence to GUAM for refit. RAZORBACK about 15 mi. astern. Made two training dives.

0140 SJ radar interception bearing 223o(T).

0235 Exchanged call signs and recognition signals with RAZORBACK.

0420 Picked up RAZORBACK on SJ radar at 7300 yds.

1000 Tried unsuccessfully to confer with RAZORBACK by VHF.

1000 Reached lat. 23o N., long. 130o E.

2100 Commenced transmitting area report to ComSubPac - our serial number two.

2315 Commenced transmitting rendezvous message to GUAM - our serial number three.

2 JANUARY 1945:

Enroute GUAM for refit in company with RAZORBACK. Made three training dives.

0100 Changed ship's time to zone description minus nine(ITEM).

0303 Received information dispatch from CTS 17.7 concerning routing to GUAM.

3 JANUARY 1945:

Enroute GUAM for refit in company with RAZORBACK. Made three training dives. Had the first good weather we've had in 34 days.

4 JANUARY 1944:

Enroute GUAM for refit in company with RAZORBACK. Made three training dives.

5 JANUARY 1945:

ARRIVED GUAM FOR REFIT: