

**From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S.SEGUNDO(SS3S8).**  
**To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.**  
**(1)The Commander Submarine Division ONE TWENTY-TWO.**  
**(2)The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.**  
**(3)The Commander Submarine Forces, Pacific Fleet.**  
**(4)The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.**

**Subject: U.S.S.SEGUNDO(SS338) - Report of War Patrol Number Four.**

**Enclosure: (A)Subject Report.**

**(B)Track Chart(ComSubPac only)**

**1. Enclosure(A), covering the Fourth War Patrol of this vessel conducted in the YELLOW SEA & EAST CHINA SEA areas during the period from 26 April 1945 to 21 June 1945, is forwarded herewith.**

**J.D.FULP, Jr.**

**(A) PROLOGUE:**

Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, from Third War Patrol on 26 March 1945. Assigned to the Base for refit and to ComSubDiv FORTY THREE and ComSubRon FOUR for administration,

Ship's company quartered at the Submarine Base Rest and Recuperation Annex (Royal Hawaiian) for sixteen days. Refit was extended three days for a total of seventeen, two days extra availability being granted to remedy end-play in bow planes and one day to make tight the forward battery soft patch. The following new equipment was installed by refit activities:

1. ST Radar
2. TDM on QB gear.
3. DRT (located in Control Rocs).
4. Speed halving device for TDC,
5. True bearing indicator for SJ Radar.
6. Cooling down pumps.
7. Dutch hatches.
8. **Ammunition scuttle.**
9. 40 mm forward (had one aft already).
10. Cutler-Hammer starters for hydraulic and trim pumps.
11. Lang-Sherman ice cream freezer.
12. Various new stop valves on fuel and air lines.
13. Traveling nut type periscope lower limit switches.
14. Ward-Leonard hydrogen burner circuits forward and aft.
15. A new Roots-Connersville low pressure ballast unloading blower, with discharge silencer, to replace the experimental Hamilton-Whitfield, no spares being available for the latter.
16. SCR-610 voice radio set.
17. RBS high frequency receiver.
18. Loran.

The training period comprised six days and two nights and consisted of seventeen rehearsal runs and sixteen firing runs, plus a lifeguard exercise and an exercise on a seven ship screened convoy. Training Officer was ComSubDiv FORTY THREE. We feel very much obliged to Commander BENSON for his whole-hearted direction of the refit and for his valuable suggestions and efforts during the training period.

**(B) NARRATIVE:**

**Officers and Chief Petty Officers on board with number of patrols including the one covered by this report:**

Commander J.D.FULP, Jr., USN	11 War Patrols
Lieut-Comdr. C.P.CALLAHAN, USN (PCD)	9
Lieutenant J.E.BALSON, USNR	4
Lieutenant N.E.AUBREY,	4
Lieut(jg)J.K.BRDZO, USNR	4
Lieut(jg)J.P.NcLAU6HLIN, USNR	4
Lieut(jg)J.A.L.HAHN, USNR	3
Lieut(jg)L.R.JOHNSON, USNR	4
Ensign G. A. Best USN	1
RUSSELL, E.A. CTM(SS)	9
DOWNS, J.T. CMoMM(SS)	12
VON BEHREN, A.C. CMoMM(SS)	14
MATHEWS, D.G. CEM(SS)	7
MARVEL, P(n) CQM	4

#### **26 APRIL 1945:**

1330 Underway for SAIPAN in accordance with ComSubPac Op Ord #76-A-45 in company with U.S.S.MUSKALLUNGE(SS262) & U.S.S.JACK(SS259). Escorted by PC 778 until dark. During the voyage to SAIPAN the following training was conducted by all three boats of the group:

- (a) Three training dives daily.
- (b) One submerged approach daily using the other two boats as targets.
- (c) From one to two hours daily radar tracking on one boat which had been designated as target.
- (d) Several test-firings of guns.

The above training was very beneficial.

#### **8 MAY 1945:**

0530 Effected rendezvous with escort PC 1591. U.S.S.BANG(SS385) joined the formation.

1140 moored outboard of JACK in nest alongside to starboard of U.S.S.ORION(AS18) in TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN.

A few words of comment on the ORION. The morale of squadron personnel and of ship's officers and seen was exceptionally high. The repair department went about our voyage repairs in a thorough, efficient and business like manner; their attitude was "ask and ye shall receive". Most outstanding to us and to us most indicative of the high state of efficiency and discipline existing in this ship was the performance of its laundry. In the first place they practically begged us to let them do our laundry. We were somewhat retiring about sending it for overnight service on account of having lost from one-third to one-half with regular service elsewhere lately. However, we consented, and that ship, in addition to our laundry, took the laundry of three other submarines and had all of it back the following morning. As far as can be ascertained not as much as one sock was lost. Remarkable. It was our first experience with the ORION. It was a pleasant one.

#### **9 MAY 1945:**

1200 Celebrated the first birthday of this ship with a fancy dinner.

1600 Underway for patrol area in accordance with ComSubPac Op Ord #102-45 in company with U.S.S.JACK & U.S.S.BANG. Escorted by LCI 1098 until 2120.

2120 Escort returned to SAIPAN. BAKER BANS left formation and set course for Pearl.

#### **10 MAY 1945:**

0400 Master gyro out of commission. Commenced steering by auxiliary gyro.

1200 Position: 15-35 N., 147-10 E.

2130 Master gyro back in commission. Trouble was a faulty socket for amplifier tube; very difficult to locate because the tube would test O.K. about 09% of the time.

#### **11 MAY 1945:**

1200 Position: 18-09 N., 137-46 E.

#### **12 MAY 1945:**

0840 Spoke U.S.S.LIONFISH(SS298) by light.

1200 Position: 23-35 N., 137-32 E.

1535 Sighted U.S.S.BOWFIN(SS267), and obtained some area information from her Commanding Officer by SCR-610

**13 MAY 1945:**

1200 Position: 27-50 N., 137-22 E.

**14 MAY 1945:**

0600 Reached Lifeguard station at Lat. 31 N., Long. 139 E.

0622 Superforts began to fly over, NA60YA bound. All were showing IFF.

0925 One Superfort sighted on a course for SAIPAN. Starboard outboard engine was dead but pilot said he could make it to base. No IFF from this one.

0930 A dumbo plane was scheduled to cover us from this time until end of strike. He did not show up all day. Neither were any fighters seen. Learned later that weather had kept fighters grounded.

1200 Position: 30-59 N., 139-05 E.

1320 Spoke a dumbo returning to base. Said he knew of no business for us. Continued to occupy Lifeguard station, although it appeared that all planes had passed us on return trip.

1633 Made trim dive.

**15 MAY 1945:**

Occupied Lifeguard station. No strikes scheduled.

1122 Dove for unidentified SD contact 7 mi. Found out that our BN was not up to snuff. Plane probably friendly

1153 Surfaced.

1200 Position: 30-46

N., 138-46 E. 1348 SD

contact 16 mi., friendly.

1706 Made trim dive.

2030 Received instructions to transfer EC to TREPANS, then to proceed to EAST CHINA & YELLOW SEAS. Notified TREPANG of our ETA at rendezvous over Pack Frequency.

**16 MAY 1945:**

0610 Spoke TREPANG by SJ radar.

0640 Commenced transfer of ECU.

0720 Transfer completed. Transfer was facilitated and rendered fool proof by Trepan's modified breeches buoy which they had made up and which was rigged very easily. A stout 3 inch line was secured to the top of our periscope shears; TREPANG ran the other end through a block hung from the top of her shears and tended the free end to keep all slack out. It was a clever method. We could have transferred a man as easily as the ECU.

1200 Position: 30-13 N., 136-17 E.

1556 SD contact 16 mi., friendly.

2241 Encountered weak SJ radar interference bearing 244(T). Unable to communicate.

**17 MAY 1945:**

0400 Set clocks back one hour to minus nine time.

0400 APR contact at 150 MGS, SD contact at 6 mi., unidentified. SJ contact at 16,000 yds.

0408 Lost contacts. Night was dark.

1200 Position: 29-36 N., 131-44 E.

1224 APR contact 150 MGS, weak and sweeping.

1254 SD contact 28 mi., unidentified.

1257 Contact faded at 30 mi.

1328 Detonated 50-inch floating mine in position lat. 29-25 N., long. 131-31 E.

1457 SD contact on YAKU SHIHA at 70 mi. Remarkable performance.

1730 Made trim dive.

1915 SJ interference bearing 183(T). Unable to communicate. PRF 1350.

1940 SJ contact on YAKU SHIHA at 108,000 yds.

2105 SJ interference bearing 225(T), PRF 1430, and 23CKT), PRF 1650.

2111 In approaching TOKAR GUNTO encountered the first of many APR contacts at following frequencies: 80, 100, 200, 220, 155, 207, 210, 225, 195, 187. All appeared to be land-based.

**18 MAY 1945:**

In the approaches to passage south of AKUSEKI JIMA.

0145 Passed AKUSEKI JIMA abeam to starboard, distance 10 mi.

0203 SJ contact bearing 339(T), range 9450. Went to tracking stations. At

0207 we received SJ interference from this contact. At

0210 exchanged recognition signals and calls with MUSKALUNGE(SS262), who tracked on a southeasterly (opposite) course. Somewhat stymied by this as MUSKALUNGE should be about one day more into the EAST CHINA SEA than we are. We were expecting to pass DRAGONET on an opposite course. Tried to ask MUSKALUNGE if she was in trouble but got no response. She tracked at about 16.5 knots so she could not have been completely out of commission.

0234 New APR contact at 148 MGS; appeared to be air-borne. SD showed range to be 6 mi., and at

0240 both SD and SJ showed range at 10 mi. Contact faded from APR at 0245.

0447 Dove for strong APR contact at 150 MGS. It was about half-light now.

1200 Position: 30-07 N, 129-18 E.

1306 Surfaced. Had been of the opinion that our air forces had neutralized enemy air strength in this theater and had run submerged during the forenoon only to open out on the islands.

1315 Sighted floatplane RUFU close aboard. Dove. RUFU was in a shallow power dive headed directly for us. No bombs, much to our surprise.

1730 Passed two cadavers close aboard. One was a Jap; one a Yank.

1802 Sighted two RUFUS flying toward TOKARA GUNTO.

1958 Surfaced. The APR was laden with contacts and continued to be for the rest of the night. We were interested mainly in contacts at 150 MGS(A/C) and 157 MGS(Jap SS), but there were too many of both of these to give them much consideration. Since this submarine departed this area about two months ago radar activity has more than doubled.

2000 Noted two sets of interference on the SJ, PRF's 1420 and 1530, both to the southward - astern. One was weak and soon disappeared; the other was medium and continued to be so. All attempts to get this submarine to answer up failed. He stayed with us until early morning

### **19 MAY 1945:**

During the night received a rotating patrol plan from RAY. Also received information explaining our meeting with MUSKALLUNGE last night; hope it is nothing serious.

0109 Picked out one APR contact at 150 MGS that appeared to be air-borne, flipped on SD and found a prominent contact at 4 mi. Dove. It used to be that you could see the exhaust of these night radar planes. It appears now that the enemy has corrected this; at least we haven't seen any exhaust out of a half dozen chances.

0144 Surfaced. APR laden as before. Two saturated contacts at 156 MGS and a couple at 150 MGS. Most unusual, the nearest land is forty miles away.

0415 Realized an explanation for all the APR activity. Made SJ contact on land at 37,000 yds., bearing 055(T). This could not be; checking thoroughly we decided it was a secondary on the peaks of NAGASAKI PENINSULA. These peaks are only about 1300 ft. high. It evidently is one of those rare nights when radar waves travel in ducts. Earlier we had noticed examples of this; UJI SUNTO had been on the radar at 70,000 yds., and its highest peak is only about 550 ft. What holds for our radar should hold for Jap radar; therefore our APR has been picking them up something out of the ordinary.

0445 Picked out another APR contact at 150 MGS that appeared to be air-borne. SD radar showed contact at 3 ii. Dove. It was now half-light. Plane not sighted. Shortly before diving received a message on Pack frequency from one of our planes addressed to ail subs. Our first experience with the new system. It bids fair to be the answer.

1200 Position: 32-12 N., 128-55 E.

1959 Surfaced halfway between FUKAE SKIHA & DANJO GUNTO. Expected to be harassed by night-flying planes but, oddly enough, none were encountered. Completed transit of this passage without difficulty.

2304 Picked up SJ interference ahead, PRF 140 C. 2330 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with RATON(SS270).

### **20 MAY 1945:**

0142 Picked up SJ interference bearing 220(T), PRF 1540.

0250 Exchanged recognition signals and call signs with COD(SS224).

0453 Dove for submerged patrol south of SAISHU TO.

1200 Position: 32-52~N., 126-34 E.

2001 Surfaced.

2135 Received contact report from COMADVSRFARING TWO on six tankers lying to at 35-13 N., 124-12 E. Later information stated that probable movement of this group was southwest. Set course to intercept.

**21 MAY 1945:**

0100 Sent message to COMADVSRFARING TWO asking for further infuriation on tankers and received a negative reply.

0625 In position 33-50 N., 124-06 E. sighted first of ten floating mines stretched along our course (315 (T)) for fifty mi. we did not take the time to sink them because of the aircraft contact report on the six tankers.

1100 Made trim dive. We are now bearing southwest from the reported position. Changed course to head for that position.

1200 Position: 34-40 N., 123-35 E.

1722 High periscope watch sighted first of five Chinese Junks. These junks happened to be about twenty mi. from the tankers reported position. Could they have been the tankers?

1910 Put boarding party on the nearest junk. Boarding party composed of LT(jg) J.P.McLAUGHLIN, USNR & CTM E.A. RUSSELL, USN. Much obeisance and Kow-towing from the Chinese crew of about eighteen men and one old crone. Boarding party reported nothing of value on board except a few fish and some flour, and a quantity of good MANILA line. They were a funny, scared lot. We passed them some SPAM, bread, cigarettes and matches. Went close aboard two of the other junks and found the same conditions.

2135 Picked up SJ radar interference bearing 135(T), assumed to be from SHAD who has reported being unable to key her radar.

**22 MAY 1945:**

0000 SJ radar interference bearing north. Made radar contact at

0105 with source of this interference at 13,000 yds. and at

0110 exchanged recognition signals with BALAO.

0005 Converted #4 FBT. Time required 50 minutes.

0203 Dove to flush #4 M.B.T.

0500 Reached assigned station, vicinity of lat. 37 N., Long. 124 E., and became a unit of LEGIONNAIRES under the tactical command of COMMANDER N.T.KINSELLA, USN, in RAY. This group is composed of the following submarines: - RAY, SCABBARDFISH, SEACAT, BILLFISH, SHAD, BALAO & SEGUNDO.

0758 Dove.

2245 Exchanged recognition signals with RAY by SJ radar.

2312 Received contact report from BALAO, fifty mi. to the westward, went to full speed to close.

**23 MAY 1945:**

0033 Spurious SJ contact at 23,000 yds.

0100 BALAO reported that her contact was a freak.

0704 Dove.

1200 Position: 36-56 N., 124-45 E.

1312 Surfaced.

1550 SJ contact on SHANTUNG PENINSULA at 120,000 yds. Secondary echoes. See Section (H) for details of phenomenal radar performance. Maximum elevation 1800 ft.

1607 SJ contact on land in vicinity of CHOSAN KAN(KOREA) at about 125,000 yds. Secondary echoes. Maximum elevation 1500 ft.

1830 Fog lifted abruptly: visibility unlimited.

1925 Sighted BALAO. Closed and conversed. Learned that her stern planes had frozen and that she would probably leave the area.

2100 Commenced shifting stations. Stations are to be shifted at dark of every 5th day from to-day.

2127 APR contact at 150 MGS which reached medium strength then faded. Probably a plane in transit.

**24 MAY 1945:**

0008 Exchanged recognition signals and call signs with BALAO via SJ radar.

0217 Exchanged recognition signals and call signs with SCABBARDFISH via SJ radar.

0550 Dove.

1120 Surfaced.

1200 Position: 36-49 N., 123-55 E.

1258 SD contact at 10 mi., unidentified. Dove with contact at 8 mi. Visibility unlimited but plane not sighted.

1557 Surfaced.

1610 SD contact at 25 mi., unidentified, which closed to 23 mi. and faded there. Believe this was one of our Recon planes.

1734 Secondary echoes(SJ) on KAKUREPPI RETTO(elev. 397 ft)at about 115,000 yds. See Section (H) for phenomenal radar performance.

2052 Picked up strong SJ interference bearing 015(T). Decided emanations were SHAD since we not get her to answer up. She verified this assumption over the Pack frequency.

### **25 MAY 1945:**

Cruising in vicinity of SHOKU TO & OSEI TO in 15 to 20 fathoms of water. Moon nearly full; very bright.

0300 Commenced opening out from land.

0620 Sighted sails of three small fishing vessels.

0757 Dove to close the coast. Nothing ten minutes of diving a dense fog set in, visibility zero. There had been no indication of fog prior to diving. Commenced searching with the ST.

1200 Position: 35-52 N., 125-33 E.

1201 Sharp ST contact at 8850 yds. which disappeared in about two minutes. Believed to have been a plane. 1910 Surfaced, opened out from land. Visibility about 100 yds.

1945 Sunset. Fog lifted. Full moon.

### **26 MAY 1945:**

Cruising in vicinity of SHOKU TO OSEI TO.

0255 Looked into OSEI TO BYOCHI at 4500 yds. No ships anchored there.

0450 Dove for submerged patrol near the islands.

0530 At sunrise the visibility closed down.

1130 Visibility improved somewhat.

1200 Position: 35-56 N., 125-41 E. 2008 Surfaced.

### **27 MAY 1945:**

0448 Dove for close submerged patrol off OSEI TO.

0700 Sighted first of five sailing vessels inside the ten fathom curve.

1200 Position: 35-56 N., 125-55 E.

1348 Sighted one EMILY as it came over OSEI TO.

2004 Surfaced. This night turned out to be another night of phenomenal radar conditions. We were receiving, at the same time, the SJ interference of four of the submarines in this group, the nearest being 75 mi. away.

### **28 MAY 1945:**

0502 Dove for submerged patrol between KAKUREPPI RETTO & OSEI TO in 15 to 20 fathoms of water.

0820 Visibility closed down. Manned ST radar.

1138 Sighted two planes in the haze, believed to be CORONADOS. They were gone before we could surface and speak them with VHF

### **28 MAY 1945: (cont.)**

1200 Position: 36-20 N., 125-30 E.

2005 Exchanged recognition signals with SEACAT by SJ radar.

2050 Exchanged recognition signals with BILIFISH by SJ radar.

Notes: Tonight was the scheduled time for rotating patrol stations but a message was received from the Group Commander belaying the shift and dividing station TWO between BILIFISH & SEGUNQ. SEGUNDO now has station ONE and half of station TWO.

2115 DIEKMANN, K.H., EM1, USN, suffered minor laceration of head above left eye when he struck the knife-edge of a W.T.door. Treated by Pharmacist's Mate and closed with two stitches.

### **29 MAY 1945:**

Patrolling between MQKUTOKU TO & KAKUREPPI RETTO. Visibility poor.

0547 Dove for submerged patrol between above islands in about 20 fathoms of water. Visibility now variable; used ST radar when it closed down.

1200 Position: 36-58 N., 125-22 E.

1301 SHIP CONTACT 12 - GUN ATTACK #1.

Visibility improved. Sighted first of about sixty sailing vessels

1318 Surfaced with gun crews on station below decks. Mounted and manned one 50 Cal. M.6. on each side of Bridge. Now had six schooners in sight, all steering a course of 135CT) and apparently in transit between DAISEI GUNTO & the KOREAN ARCHIPELAGO. Took the same course, passed close aboard(50 to 100 yds.), three of them at slow speed, and looked them over carefully. The boats were fairly new, fairly clean, newly varnished and painted and all were exactly alike. Estimated displacement 100 tons.

1343 Had decided not to molest them when, as we passed the last of the three, saw a Japanese flag painted on his bow. Manned guns and fired warning shots. Each schooner carried a dinghy and we expected the crew to abandon ship but instead they all scurried below. Destroyed this one and began to look for Japanese flags on the others. Their actions before we got close enough to see the flag telegraphed whether or not we would find a flag there. Invariably the ones with flags would try to keep the flag out of view by maneuvering, most of the crew would be below, and personnel would be stalwart, surly, and unbending as you would expect Japanese to be. Whereas, the ones without the flag would hold course, all personnel would stay topside, one or more of them would make a polite bow, and the men would be more slightly built and of more friendly disposition. About fifty percent of the schooners investigated showed Jap colors and were assumed to be manned by Japanese. The remainder were unmarked, except for some sort of house markings, and were assumed to be manned by KOREANS. At

1429 went alongside one of the KOREAN vessels and motioned for one of the crew to come on board. The whole crew wanted to come and five or six got on board the submarine, but all except one were sent back. The KOREAN was selected because it was thought he would be just as well informed as the Japanese and would be more inclined to part with his information. Besides he was cleaner and was not wounded. He came on board willingly and of his own accord. At about:

1500 as we worked toward the 10 fathoms curve and as the visibility improved, we could make out at least sixty of these schooners, all identical. None appeared to be fishing. Host of them were well inside the 10 fathom curve, where we could not pursue. At:

1600 secured from battle stations having sunk or destroyed seven schooners, all of which bore Japanese markings and appeared to be manned by Japanese, and having inspected closely an equal number which bore no markings and appeared to be manned by KOREANS. It is thought that perhaps this fleet was in transit to KOREAN and Japanese ports from a small boat building yard such as exists in DAIREN. Moreover, there was the possibility that they were transporting troops. The crews, especially the Japanese, were robust, stalwart and young: their hair was cropped close and they gave one the impression that they were not sailors. There were one or two old men, obviously fishermen, in each Japanese boat. The crew of each schooner consisted of about a dozen men. Fire, believed to have been pistols, was returned by two of the schooners. It was ineffective because their first shot was a signal to us to open up with our automatic weapons.

1720 Dove after opening out to the westward.

2010 Surfaced.

2045 Exchanged recognition signals with BILLFISH by SJ radar.

2101 APR contact at 200 MGS which came and went rapidly as if air-borne. It was being keyed and not sweeping, another characteristic of air-borne radar. This was our first encounter with air-borne radar at this frequency. See Section (M).

2235 Picked up SJ radar interference bearing 200(T). As far as we know there are no boats to the southward of us. All attempts to exchange call signs failed, but the interference retained on the same bearing for the rest of the night.

### **30 MAY 1945:**

0535 Dove in the path of some ships that were reported by search planes to be crossing the YELLOW SEA.

1200 Position: 36-16 N., 124-48 E.

1641 Surfaced to change the air in the boat.

1654 Dove.

2012 Surfaced.

2035 Picked up SJ radar interference bearing 025(T), 200(T), and 345(T).

2105 Weak SJ contact bearing 205(T), range 20,000 yds. Manned tracking stations and closed at high speed. Contact disappeared at 2109 and was not regained, even though we proceeded to the spot where the ship should have been.

2155 Secured from tracking stations.

### **31 MAY 1945:**

0340 SJ contact bearing 05S(T), range 24,000 yds., weak. He were able to lobe-switch on this contact at 13,000 yds., but it then disappeared and did not reappear until the range had closed to about 9,000 yds. At 7,000 yds. the contact was seen to be a fishing schooner with sails set. After daylight the schooner gave the appearance of being an innocent KOREAN engaged in fishing. It is not believed that he was using radar windows or other radar decoy or deception devices.

0443 Dove for submerged patrol between the OIYONU GROUP & KAKUREPPI RETTO in 17 to 24 fathoms of water. Had several KOREAN fishing boats in sight most of the day.

1200 Position: 36-12 N., 125-46 E.

1311 Sighted our two search planes(CORONADOS)doing a thorough job of searching the waters around these islands. Did not surface and speak them on account of close proximity to OIYONU.

2023 Surfaced in half-light and commenced opening out on KAKUREPPI RETTO.

2150 SHIP CONTACT #3 - TORPEDO ATTACK #1.

Made SJ contact bearing 030(T), range 21,000 yds. Radar was able to lobe-switch on target from 18,000 to 16,000 yds, had difficulty tracking from 16,000 to 10,000 yds., and then was able to lobe-switch again. Target sighted in binoculars at 8,000 yds. At about 3,000 yds. the great gray sails of a large four-masted full-rigged ship hove into sight. Target tracked on course 220(T) at 3.5 knots. Made a high speed pass at about 700 yds. to size up target, which measured between 200 and 225 ft. by binoculars - radar, and seemed to be quite a large ship. Came around to southwest to avail submarine of KAKURAPPI RETTO land background and started approach from about 3000 yds. At

2253 commenced firing tubes #6 & #5, zero gyro angles, 500 yd. torpedo run, 90 degree port track, using a 2 knot enemy speed input because did not believe ship was taking the 3.5 knots that plot said he was taking. About 30 seconds after firing first torpedo, observed one hit slightly abaft MOT, whereupon the ship immediately broke into two parts and disappeared with the exception of the tips of the forecastle and poop. Target was probably taking 3.5 knots. A few seconds before firing the second torpedo, the slew left relay spring on forward gyro-setter carried away, causing the forward gyros to slew left against the stops. No. 2 torpedo(#5 tube) is believed to have gone out with approximately 30 degrees left gyro on it, which explains the miss of this torpedo.

2324 Secured from battle stations.

2325 Made SJ contact at 025(T), range 32,000 yds. Contact faded at 25,000 yds. and was not regained, although submarine closed to within 10,000 yds. of original location. Chalked this up as another freak, of which there have been many.

### **1 JUNE 1945:**

0052 Secured from tracking stations.

0648 Dove

1200 Position: 36-34 N., 125-01 E.

2010 Surfaced. Proceeded to MOKUTOKU TO at high speed to take a sweep north westward along the ten fathoms curve in the direction of CHOSAN KAN.

### **2 JUNE 1945:**

0100 The moon has risen and it is quite light. Headed out from ten fathom curve.

0501 Dove for submerged patrol in the bight formed by KAKUREPPI RETTQ & GAIEN RETTO and associated islands. Had several fishing vessels in sight during the day.

1200 Position: 36-30 N., 125-40 E.

2030 Surfaced. Commenced shifting stations

2042 Picked up SJ radar interference bearing 315(T), PRF 1500. Very exasperating. Tried off and on for an hour or more to exchange calls with him without success.

2145 Commenced chase of a spurious SJ contact bearing 202(T), initial range 17,700 yds. Closed this contact at high speed until beyond the original location. It disappeared about two minutes after being picked up and did not reappear.

2232 Abandoned chase and proceeded to new station off DAISEI GUNTO.

### **3 JUNE 1945:**

0025 Reached a point 5 mi. from HOKUTOKU TO and changed course to northwest to take a high speed sweep along the 10 fathom curve.

0040 SHIP CONTACT #4 - TORPEDO ATTACK #2 - GUN ATTACK #2.

Made SJ contact bearing 305(T), range 10,400 yds. Made fast pass at about 1000 yds. to size up target, which was a four-masted sailing vessel measuring 125 ft. in length and having 10 to 12 ft. of freeboard. Target tracked on course 140(T), speed 4.5 knots. This course showed ship to be in coastal traffic lane from CHOSAN KAN to the restricted waters of the West KOREAN ARCHIPELAGO.

0055 Manned battle stations.

0130 Fired one torpedo on a 100 starboard track, gyro nine right, torpedo run 620 yds. Torpedo missed about 5 ft. astern. Manned deck gun and both 40 millimeters. A second quarter moon rose at this time.

0144 Commenced firing deck gun and 40 millimeters at a range of 300 yds. As soon as the forties had neutralized the topside, closed in for the kill with the five inch whose accuracy was not very good while the forties were firing due to flash blindness. Accuracy of the forty millimeters was excellent and most gratifying. These guns are superb and wicked; coupled with the 5 inch, which is itself an ideal submarine gun, the submarine has a formidable battery. As soon as fire was checked on the forties the five inch commenced to get about fifty percent hits. We estimate seventy-five percent hits from the forties over-all. At

0153 after five hits from the five inch, mostly in the stern, target's stern settled beneath the surface and bow rose high in the air. Just before the stern settled, a boat was lowered into the water and one man commenced sculling away from his ship. Three hits out of the last four shots brought the bow down and stern back up. Ship was left with its decks awash and its topsides a shambles. It was denuded of all masts except one. Ship is considered a total loss. It was strongly built and was surprisingly hard to destroy. No fires were started, although smoldering glows were seen. Believe that fires were prevented by the wetting down of near misses.

0215 Made SJ contact bearing 115(T), range 34,000 yds. Contact was faint but not exactly spurious; it was not possible to track it, but by navigational plot, estimated course 160(T) and speed 11 knots. Its position was between MQKUTOKU TO & KOKU TO and we assumed that, if it was a ship, it came down the FLYINGFISH CHANNEL then headed for the southward. He closed at full speed for thirty minutes without developing the contact. Sent contact report (receipt from all except BILLFISH) when it appeared target had gotten past KOKU TO and was in the sanctuary ten fathom curve where we could not follow in the bright moonlight. Doubt retains as to whether or not this contact was real.

0303 Came about to try to gain assigned station before dawn.

0456 Dove in assigned area. Fishing boats in sight off and on.

1200 Position: 37-09 N., 125-03 E.

2024 Surfaced. Patrolled across the route between DAISEI GUNTO & HOKUTOKU TO.

2355 First Lieutenant made unsuccessful search of superstructure for source of rattle which was possibly an empty shell case.

### **4 JUNE 1945:**

044S Dove for submerged patrol south of the DAISEI GUNTO. Many fishing vessels in sight during the day. Charged torpedoes.

1200 Position: 37-31 N., 125-20 E.

1612 Surfaced under cover of a heavy fog to change the air in the boat.

1626 Dove.

2024 Surfaced. Proceeded to ten fathom curve for patrol in the DAISEI GUNTO - HOKUTOKU TO traffic lane. This night was exceedingly black; passed fishing boats as close as 400 yds, without sighting them. The sea was very phosphorescent. Most of the fishermen carry din white lights.

### **5 JUNE 1945:**

Received notice from RAY & BILLFISH that they were departing area. Our records now show that only SEACAT & SESUNDO are left in area with SESUNDO being the senior boat.

0447 Dove close to SHOSKI TO of the DAISEI GUNTO for submerged patrol to the westward toward SHANTUNS PROMONTORY. Many fishing vessels and dinghies in sight during the day.

1200 Position: 37-35 N., 124-34 E. "

1240 Visibility closed in. Manned ST radar.

1605 Visibility improved.

2027 Surfaced. Set course for the ten fathom curve to patrol along probable traffic lane. Passed many fishing boats, most of which were burning one white light.

2150 Exchanged calls with BILLFISH by SJ radar.

#### **6 JUNE 1945:**

Received message from SEACAT saying that she would patrol off PORT ARTHUR remaining time in area unless otherwise directed. Since we do not know the patrol plans of Task-Group 17.18 and 17.19, TECHNICIANS & SLEEPERS, it seems best that we both go up in that vicinity. He have received a message from Commander Task Group 17-19 containing patrol instructions to his group.

0400 Reached MQKUTOKU TO and changed course to west.

0627 Dove.

1200 Position: 36-59 N., 124-54 E.

1615 Surfaced for the purpose of closing CHO KAN and taking preparations to transmit a weather report.

1739 Sighted sailing vessel and commenced closing to size it up.

1824 Sighted one aircraft, JILL, coming out of the sun. Made quick dive, expecting tm be bombed on the way down. SD radar out of commission.

1831 At 100 ft., and on a course 120 degrees to the left of diving course, received one bomb, close, plainly indicating use of magnetic detection gear.

1834 Another bomb, close. Eased down to 130 ft. and changed course to 270(T) to minimize effectiveness of his detection gear. This submarine is checked daily for air leaks and there were none; besides the sea was choppy with many white caps. The water was murky; it is doubtful that the hull of a submarine at periscope depth could be seen from the air.

1907 At periscope depth; all clear.

2041 Surfaced in half-light. SD contact at 4 mi. Dove. Plane not sighted.

2126 Surfaced. Commenced sending weather report. Could not reach PEARL or GUAM; LEYTE heard us but was unable to read. After trying to send on normal frequencies for two hours without success, gave the message to ComiFairWing Two on pack frequency for relay. There was some trouble on pack frequency.

#### **7 JUNE 1945:**

0002 Set course north for patrol off CHO TO.

0337 SHIP CONTACT #5 - GUN ATTACK #3.

Made SJ contact bearing 330(T), range 9050 yds. Closed to investigate. Ship was on a westerly course between the DAISEI 6UNTO & SHANTUNG PROMONTORY. Sighted ship at 6,000 yds. and at 3,000 yds. made it out to be a four masted sailing vessel similar to the one destroyed in gun attack #2. Manned gun stations and waited about 10 minutes for day to break. At

0437 made a fast pass at a range of 500 yds. raking his topside with all automatic weapons. Topside was reduced on this pass, so then leisurely completed destruction of the target with the 5 inch deck gun. Fire of all guns was very accurate. Two of the vessel's crew abandoned ship. Close inspection showed them to be very definitely Japanese. One was clinging to a life ring and the other to a timber. This vessel was new, solidly built, and appeared to be heavily loaded. One man clambered onto what was left of the poop deck with a rifle, but a few bursts from the 20 MM discouraged him from using it.

0545 Dove. Decided to proceed toward PORT ARTHUR instead of CHO TO.

1200 Position: 38-05 N., 123-54 E.

2022 Surfaced. There had been numerous single masted sail boats in sight all day. They looked like innocent fishermen but thought they would bear investigating. At

2044 went close aboard one of them, taking care not to run afoul of his net. All were Chinese and scared to death until we passed them some presents of tinned peaches and cigarettes. At this act of friendship they loosened up, started jabbering and squawking, and in turn presented us with a tab full of fish. The fish were either dried or rotten, or both, and we promptly gave them the deep six as soon as clear of our friends.

2218 Greatest radar range to date; a secondary echo on land at 200,000 yds.

2244 Hade SJ radar contact bearing 05CKT), range 27,000 yds. Commenced closing at high speed, dodging fishing boats which were spaced about two tiles apart. It was possible to lobe-switch on this contact at 27,000 yds., but at 24,000 the pip began to waver and single lobing was required. Resumed lobe-switching at 16,000 yds. When close enough to see target, it was made out to be an ordinary fisherman just like all the others; this was

verified for certain by inspection at 150 yds. For the next three or four hours there were several such contacts all of which turned out to be sail boats.

### **8 JUNE 1945:**

0405 Exchanged calls with SEA DEVIL by SJ radar.

0444 Dove for patrol to eastward of KAIYO TO, guarding eastern end of GAICHOSAN SUIDO. Numerous fishing vessels in sight during the day.

1200 Position: 3S-53 N., 123-22 E.

1459 Heard first of a long series of heavy distant explosions, which did not sound exactly like depth charges and were thought to have been submarine volcanic disturbances. They ceased at about 1600.

2032 Surfaced and commenced transit of GAICHOSAN SUIDO toward DAIREN. Avoided many fishermen.

2137 SHIP CONTACT #6 - TORPEDO ATTACK #3 - GUN ATTACK #4.

Sighted two bright lights and commenced closing. All the fishermen's lights are a single dim white light, but these did not look like fishermen's lights. At

2209 made SJ contact on this vessel at 9550 yds. Maximum range on fishermen this night had been about 4500 yds. At 3000 yds. sighted what appeared to be a tow astern of the lights. The night was very dark and we could not see much. It looked like some sort of a trap. Tracked targets on steady course of 210(T) which would have carried them just clear of the west tangent of KAIYO TO. After much deliberation and tracking decided to treat the contact as tug and to. as it appeared to be. The tug looked like a good sized one. Shortly before firing, saw a door open at the main deck level of the tug, disclosing a brightly lighted interior. At

2301 fired first of two torpedoes from bow tubes on a 90 starboard track, range about 600 yds. As torpedoes were leaving the tube the tug started belching sparks from his stack, turned toward and attempted to ram submarine. Submarine turned away and went to full speed. Tug missed our stern by about 100 yds. Submarine brought him bearing 180(R), slowed to 10 knots and fired one torpedo from stern nest down the throat at a range of 580 yds. All torpedoes missed. All torpedoes set to run at 3 ft. There was a moderate chop to the seas but no swell. Approach Officer saw first torpedo surf-board on a straight, normal run and miss ahead of target. Tug now doused his lights and both tug and tow commenced fiddling around at a speed of about 1.5 knots on no particular courses. They were about two miles off KAIYO TO. Submarine was chagrined at having wasted three good torpedoes and lay off trying to figure a way to "get" the enemy. Depth of water about 20 fathoms.

### **9 JUNE 1945:**

The night seemed to be too dark for gun action but this was our only recourse. The vessels could be made out as blots on the horizon at 2000 yds. The 'tug' conveniently exhibited one very dim light about amidships which could be seen with the naked eye at 1000 yds. Submarine positioned itself between target and land, gave gun crews about 20

minutes to become night adapted, then started in for gun attack at high speed presenting a small angle on the bow.

At

0022 when all guns reported being able to see the target and range was 700 yds., turned right to bring all guns to bear, slowed, and opened fire with all guns except the 20 MM on the "tug". 20 MM had been designated to fire at the 'tow'. Tracers provided all the illumination necessary. We now saw that the targets were two patrol vessels, and that the trailing one was trying to pull a ramming act. Submarine turned left to keep all guns bearing and shifted fire of the five inch to the trailing one. However, the 20 MM was doing a beautiful job of neutralizing this one single-handed. As submarine and trailing vessel passed each other on opposite course at about 75 yds. the 20 MM emptied its second magazine into the pilot house with few, if any, misses and set it on fire. A hit from the five inch promptly put the fire out by blowing the pilot house away. After the first pass the leading vessel was sinking by the stern and trailing vessel was out of control. Made two more passes at the trailing one firing all guns except the forties whose ammunition was running low. Delivered the 'coup de grace' with the five inch and both targets were seen to sink. Both vessels fired at submarine with 37 MM or better. Most of their shots must have been short because the splashes threw water on deck and on the bridge. The enemy's guns were quickly silenced by our superior fire power. The only explanation for their failure to fire on the submarine during the torpedo attack is that their guns crews could not see well enough. No doubt the guns crews came on deck at the time we saw the door open, and having come out of such a brightly lighted place they would have been good to even find their gun.

0040 During the above gun action we had received information from planes of Fairwing TWO by way of ComSubPac that several transports and freighters were heading up the West Coast of KOREA ostensibly to cross the YELLON SEA near the latitude of the SHANTUNG PENINSULA. Set course for the DAISEI GUNTO at full speed.

0046 Secured from battle stations.

0120 Exchanged calls with SEA DEVIL by SJ radar.

0300 Sent message to TIRANTE(SHEEFERS) requesting to be assigned a patrol station. No receipt. Realized that SEGUNDO was senior ship in area but our information of the whereabouts of the other six boats was too meager to permit stationing them for interception

0541 Dove for patrol west of the DAISEI GUNTO on the DAISEI GUNTO - SHANTUNG PROMONTORY line. Several small fishing vessels in sight.

0847 SHIP CONTACT #7.

Sighted smoke and two masts bearing 153(T). Bearings hauled right rapidly showing ship to be westbound for SHANTUNG PROMONTORY. At

0949 after waiting long enough to insure not being sighted, surfaced and commenced end-around. Ship had one large escort, was on base course 275(T), instead of 260(T) as he should have been, and was making 11 to 13 knots good. It looked as if they might be heading for shoal water northward of SHANTUNG PENINSULA possibly ultimately for PORT ARTHUR.

1200 Position: 37-51 N., 123-15 E.

1218 Dove on track about 25,000 yds. ahead. One fishing vessel about 3 miles away when we dove.

1235 Sighted ship coming out of haze with zero angle on the bow. Bearing 088(T). Too good to be true. At

1245 ship changed course to the left about 45 degrees, presenting a 45 degree starboard angle on the bow. Approach Officer thought this was a zig, knew he was on track and didn't intend to get sucked off the track, so continued to head for the target at 4 knots. At

1255 target was still presenting a large starboard angle and the awful truth began to dawn on the Approach Officer. Commenced high speed approach. At

1340 ship presented a 120 starboard angle, range 7,000 yds. Escort was taking position astern. Both ships had gotten by the range of our MK 18 torpedoes. Minimum torpedo run was 5900 yds.

Ship was a new type freighter-transport of about 7500 tons; mast - funnel - mast arrangement; flush deck with a raised island forward and amidships. Masts were 70 ft. high with slender pig sticks on top. Escort was a large DD or DE having two gun mounts forward and a heavy, short, single stick mast. It was not positively identified as such, but could have been a TERUTSUKI destroyer. ST radar was used successfully to measure mast head height at 7300 yds. Sound contact was not made by submarine, so turn count could not be obtained. Target tracked at 11 knots during submerged approach. It is possible, but not probable, that a firing range would have been reached had Approach Officer come to normal approach course at high speed as soon as ship gave a starboard angle on the bow. The approach took place about 20 mi. NNE of SHANTUNG PROMONTORY which did not permit another end-around. It is possible that presence and approximate location of submarine was known perhaps by detection of SD radar and/or SJ radar during the end-around. SD radar was keyed about 3 seconds out of every minute and SJ radar was used periodically to attempt radar tracking. It is not believed that the fishing vessels reported the submarine. It is most likely of all that the group followed a planned base course and that the submarine had the misfortune of diving one or two miles too far to the westward.

2032 Surfaced. Sent contact report to let other submarines know where some traffic had moved.

2129 Exchanged calls with SEA DEVIL by SJ radar.

2144 Picked up two APR contacts at 155 MGS, saturated, having characteristics of ship-borne radar. Swung ship to determine approximate bearing (340 true), and then closed at high speed for more than an hour. Contacts disappeared abruptly at 2220 and did not reappear.

### **10 JUNE 1945:**

0556 Dove for submerged patrol west of the DAISEI GUNTO. Many fishing vessels in the vicinity. Throughout the day the visibility was intermittently good and bad. Used ST radar to advantage during periods of low visibility.

1200 Position: 37-48 N., 124-02 E.

1633 Surfaced under cover of fog to change the air in the boat. Found that PPI was out of commission.

2054 Surfaced; having stayed down an extra half hour to complete repairs to SJ radar. Radar not operating at full efficiency on account of an old TR tube.

2219 Picked up SJ interference bearing 171(T), PRF 1480. Assumed this to be SEA DEVIL, but commenced trying to exchange recognition signals and calls. Interference acted very queerly, it appeared to be beamed on our bearing as if trying to attract our attention but we could not make the ship answer up.

2235 SHIP CONTACT #8 - TORPEDO ATTACKS #4 & #5.

Taking the first sweep with the SJ in about five minutes made SJ radar contact bearing 177(T), range 13,800 yds. This was also the bearing from whence the SJ interference was coming, but grew suspicious in view of the fact that the night was a poor one for radar, fog having closed down, that our SJ was not operating at usual efficiency, and that, under the best of conditions, 13,800 yds. is rather too much range to expect on a submarine. Commenced tracking. Shortly after manning tracking stations it was seen that target was hauling right while the SJ interference was hauling left. At

2245 heard and felt one explosion which we considered to have been a random depth charge but which may have been a torpedo explosion. For, as we were to learn later, the RONQUIL was making an attack on either this group or one very close to it at about this time.

RONQUIL must have been the source of the SJ interference. At a range of about 10,000 yds. an additional ship was picked up for a total of two. The second one was ahead and on the near bow of the target vessel, and was assumed to be an escort. He was performing curious antics, stopping, changing speed, even doing a circle every now and then. Assumed that either he had a radar detector or a 10 cm. radar and was aware of our presence. Main target was zigging wildly. At

2303 after determining enemy base course to be 240(T), speed 10, sent contact report to all subs in area. Receipt was received from SEACAT at once (she had departed area), and from RONQUIL after some delay. No other submarines receipted for this message. Closed in to an average range of about 5500 yds. in an attempt to clarify the situation. A submerged approach was indicated on account of the escort having radar but was out of the question on account of the visibility being 500 yds at best. The large escort took up a position 60 degrees, 1800 yds., on the starboard bow of the target, just where we needed to pass for an attack, and stayed there. At

2345 received an attack report from RONQUIL which was garbled. It could have been decoded two ways as follows: sunk 00, damaged 3, out of a total of (blank)ships; or sunk 0, damaged 0, out of a total of 3 ships. In addition to this information, RONQUIL's message also stated attack completed, gave attack position, and stated that enemy was scattering. He were tracking the same group. At

2359 the escort had moved left to a position ahead of the target, so submarine started in for an attack. It was soon seen that target had changed base course to the left and that the movement of the escort had telegraphed the change. Submarine postponed attack and took up a position 2600 yds. on starboard beam of target to determine new base course.

## **11 JUNE 1945:**

0005 An additional escort, smaller than the first, joined the formation taking position on the far bow of the target. When this one arrived the large one moved back to his old position on the near bow. At

0029 when target started coming right for a series of right legs, submarine moved in for attack passing about 1500 yds. from the escort who appeared to be equipped with radar. At

0032 commenced firing tubes #6, #5, #4, #3; gyro angles about 5 degrees right, 95 degrees starboard track, torpedo runs 600 yds. Had to get close enough to use TBT firing bearings, but target was not sighted. All torpedoes were fired at MOT using radar bearings. Depths set at 6 ft. About forty seconds after firing saw, heard, and felt three terrific hits. Target disappeared from radar scope three minutes after being hit, at a range of 2000 yds., and did not reappear. Both escorts now made a couple of circles, steadied on a new base course, slowed down to 6 knots, continued to zig, but otherwise did not bat an eyelash. If this is the old highly touted SAMURAI spirit, we want none of it, none at all. Commenced reloading tubes 3 and 4. No reloads for 5 and 6. Commenced approach on the larger of the two escorts. He was using a moderate zig plan, was changing speed periodically, and stopping, apparently to listen, every five minutes or so. He was acting the part of a wary, cagey, target. At

0122 flooded down about 2 feet to bring tubes 1 & 2 under water. At

0132 came in for attack at slow speed because target was presenting a small angle. Target was now heard to be using his echo ranging gear for the first time. At

0140 commenced firing tubes #4, #3, #2, and #1; gyro angles 10 degrees left, track angles 70 degrees starboard, torpedo runs 1250 yds. All torpedoes fired at MOT, using radar bearings. Depths set at 5 ft. because state of sea did not permit less depth. All torpedoes missed. No control errors. Torpedoes 'felt' good leaving the tubes; none believed to have run erratic. Plot shows that target took drastic evasive maneuvers AFTER torpedoes passed him, but not before. Tracks of torpedoes superimposed on the plot show that two torpedoes passed under

target's stern, and one torpedo under MOT. Sound tracked torpedoes under target, but sound's limitations in this respect are fully understood, however. It was tough luck to miss and we felt our usual chagrin at having wasted torpedoes. We had not had a navigational fix for 21 hours and were now in water of 15 to 20 fathoms with patches of 5, 8, & 10 fathoms here and there, we had no alternative but to break off pursuit. Reloaded tube #3. Put the blower on the main ballast tanks

0226 Sent attack report, but got no receipts. Message was addressed to Packs 13 & 19 and SEACAT,

0500 Set course south to clear area.

0645 Dove to charge torpedoes and shift the reloads for tubes 1 & 2 down into pits for loading into tubes #5 & #6. Visibility still poor.

1200 Position: 36-05 N., 124-16 E.

1245 Made ST contact bearing 047CT), range 3000 yds. Tracked this target excellently using JP bearings and ST ranges. This was our first experience with this lash up and we were pleasantly surprised at the good results. Target was alone, not pinging, making ISO turns, tracking at 12 knots, and his movements indicated he had radar contact on our periscope and was investigating it. 180 turns checks for a U.S. Submarine. Came to SJ radar depth and got interference from target. Tried to exchange calls without success. Target was probably RONQUIL. On one occasion he came across our stern on a 90 degree port track; torpedo run 900 yds. Truly a dead duck.

1521 Surfaced.

2332 Received dispatch from PADDLE requesting that we transport a case of bad fungus infection back to base.

2342 Picked up weak SJ interference bearing 245(T), PRF lower than ours. Thought this was probably PADDLE.

## **12 JUNE 1945:**

0002 Delivered message to PADDLE giving our position course and speed in order that we would not get too far apart to rendezvous at dawn.

0011 Delivered message to PADDLE with rendezvous instructions.

0528 Having effected rendezvous took on board the following fan from PADDLE by rubber boat: - PUCKETT, Joseph E., 406 25 99, CMM(AA)(T), U.S.N.R. Rendezvous and transfer were made in a dense fog, visibility barely 200 yds. SEBUNDO lay to with PADDLE doing all the work. She displayed excellent seamanship and the whole thing required only about an hour. PUCKETT's infection covered him from head to foot, the worst case any of us had ever seen. His ankles were especially bad. He hoped that he would respond to fresh air and sunshine.

0927 Sighted floating mine. Tried to sink it with 50 cal., without success. A pretty good sea was running now, we being on the periphery of a typhoon

1200 Position: 32-31 N., 126-00 E.

1357 Dove.

0911 Surfaced. 2049 Received orders from ComSubPac to proceed to MIDWAY for refit.

1103 Received instructions from ComSubPac to keep VHF manned at all times while on surface in

### **13 JUNE 1945:**

0258 Delivered my second message to ComSubPac info ComSubPacAdministration reporting additional results.

0812 Dove.

1141 Sighted GAJA SHIMA.

1200 Position: 30-01 N.,

129-08 E.

1913 Surfaced. Headed for passage of NANSEI SHOTO south of AKUSEKI JIMA.

2230 Cleared above passage. There was only one APR contact during transit of NANSEI SHOTO. Every transit before this there have been a dozen at least.

### **14 JUNE 1945:**

0329 Made SJ radar contact on a plane at 8,000 yds. No indication on APR at 150 MGS so considered hit to be friendly, but grew doubtful as he appeared to be circling at 2 mi. We twisted and turned ourselves into a knot before he turned on his ABK and shoved off. Wise guy!

0818 Sighted one PBM MARINER at 8 miles. Exchanged recognition signals by light.

1200 Position: 29-12 N., 133-31 E.

2110 Converted #3 & #5 FBTs into MBTs.

### **15 JUNE 1945:**

Started taking a training dive for each section daily.

0636 Super Forts started coming over, headed for the EMPIRE.

1116 SD contact, closed to 8 miles without identifying himself. Established communication by VHF and learned that another plane was possibly in trouble. Slowed speed and reversed course; manned lifeguard frequencies and tried to get more information,

1200 Position: 29-27 N., 140-13 E.

1210 Learned from a lifeguard airplane that the plane in distress had been handled by another submarine.

Resumed course and speed for MIDWAY.

### **16 JUNE 1945:**

1200 Position: 23-20 146-21 E.

### **21 JUNE 1945:**

0700 Made rendezvous with MIDWAY air escort.

0930 ARRIVED MIDWAY.